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THE DUTY TO ADVISE THE LORAX: ENVIRONMENTAL
ADVOCACY AND THE RISK OF REFORM
KEITH W. RIZZARDI*
ABSTRACT
Lawyers have an ethical duty to advise their clients on moral,
economic, social, and political matters. When applied to the changing field
of environmental law, this abstract notion becomes provocative. Lawyers
should advise their environmental advocacy clients of the possibility that
their efforts to apply statutes or rules might initially succeed, but subse-
quent legislative reactions might defund, reform, or repeal the laws the
client’s case relied upon. As a client’s sophistication decreases, or as the
risk of adverse reactions to the client’s environmental advocacy increases,
the lawyer’s duty to advise the client of these risks can shift from discre-
tionary to mandatory.
Accordingly, to fulfill their duty as advisor, and to protect their
clients from harm, lawyers should be sure to assess their clients’ sophis-
tication, objectives, risk tolerance, and advocacy tone. In addition, to pre-
pare for the potential reactions of third parties, lawyers may also need to
advise their clients to obtain further assistance from other professionals.
While clients will ultimately choose their goals, the failure to ask hard
questions could mean that the lawyer fails to obtain informed consent
and, in some cases, could even constitute misconduct.
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In The Lorax, a Dr. Seuss story, the Once-ler and his Super-Ax-
Hacker chop down every Truffula tree to manufacture Thneeds (“a Fine-
Something-That-All-People-Need!”).1 The Lorax keeps warning the Once-ler
to stop, but eventually, the Brown Bar-ba-loots, Swomee-Swans, Humming-
Fish, and the Lorax all leave behind a treeless and polluted gray landscape.
Environmental advocates identify with the Lorax, who “speaks for the
trees, for the trees have no tongues.”2 But their literary alignment can be
re-envisioned. If the body of environmental law is a forest of Truffula trees,
have environmental advocates become the Once-ler? Environmental advo-
cates, in their historic and passionate quest to save the trees, must avoid
Once-ler-like tendencies to over-exploit their own resources by filing too
many controversial lawsuits. Unless . . . .3
Budgetary pressures and underlying philosophical disputes threat-
en to reshape environmental law. Lawyers who practice in this field, es-
pecially those who represent the environmental advocates, should take
notice. In fact, they have an ethical duty to do so, and to advise their cli-
ents accordingly.
Environmental law can be a daunting interdisciplinary field,4 in
which complex statutory and regulatory schemes govern equally complex
1 THEODOR SEUSS GEISEL, THE LORAX (1971).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 In academia, environmental law is often part of an interdisciplinary program. See,
e.g., Pace Academy for the Environment, PACE UNIVERSITY, http://www.pace.edu/student 
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scientific matters,5 requiring the lawyers to be negotiators, litigators,
economists,6 business visionaries,7 crisis managers,8 and even media
managers.9 To some, environmental law is like history: “just one damn
thing after another.”10 Given the scope of the practice area, the duty as
advisor has endless permutations. This Article focuses on how these law-
yers should advise their clients of how their advocacy actions can produce
unwanted reactions.
As a legal matter, lawyers have a duty to advise their clients of
the moral, economic, social and political factors related to the scope of
their representation. Although a lawyer possesses substantial discretion
regarding how and when to advise clients on non-legal issues, every
lawyer also has a duty to ensure the client’s informed consent. If a client’s
desired legal action may, in the long term, prove contrary to the client’s
self-interests, then the lawyer has a duty to ensure that the client under-
stands the risks.
As a factual matter, current events suggest that environmental
advocacy groups are enduring challenging times. They may win the liti-
gation, but lose the larger policy debate, because what Congress and the
state legislatures giveth, they can taketh away.11 For both budgetary and
-handbook/pace-academy-environment (last visited Nov. 15, 2012); Water Institute, UNIVER-
SITY OF FLORIDA, http://waterinstitute.ufl.edu/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2012); Environmental
Law, Science & Policy Program, UNIVERSITY OF PITT., http://www.law.pitt.edu/academics
/juris-doctor/specialized-areas-of-study/environmental (last modified Sept. 28, 2011);
Interdisciplinary Environmental Studies at Vanderbilt, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, http://
law.vanderbilt.edu/academics/academic-programs/environmental-law/interdisciplinary
-environmental-studies/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
5 See Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy,
1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 190–91, 193 (1997).
6 David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law: Cost-Benefit
Analysis, Emissions Trading, and Priority-Setting, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 501, 501,
506–07 (2004).
7 See Andrew W. Savitz, What U.S. Environmental Lawyers Need to Know About
Sustainability, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 98, 98, 99, 101 (2002).
8 Jonathan Berstein, Crisis Management: Responding to Activism, 35 AZ ATT’Y 20 (1999).
9 Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Law, Media, & Environmental Policy: A Fundamental Linkage in
Sustainable Democratic Governance, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 511, 548 (2006) (“A sig-
nificant increase in environmental lawyers’ media sophistication may help resolve some
of the media realm’s shortcomings. Environmental lawyers at the macro and micro level are
not doing enough, or are not doing well enough, in conveying their issues into public opinion.
Environmentalists can and should work to improve their ability to communicate important
public interest facts and analysis to the public and influence the governance process.”).
10 Daniel A. Farber, Annual Review of Environmental and Natural Resources Law:
Foreword, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 383, 386 (2005).
11 “The LORD gave, and the LORD hath taken away. . . .” Job 1:21 (King James).
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philosophical reasons, legislatures are defunding, reforming, or repealing
environmental laws.
In practice, as a client’s sophistication decreases, and the poten-
tial consequences increase, the lawyer’s duty to advise becomes less
discretionary and more mandatory. The lawyer who adheres to the duty
as advisor must ensure that the client acknowledges dollars, sense, and
professionalism. Otherwise, the lawyer’s representation of the client,
whether in litigation or other advocacy, could have consequences.12
This Article is not an ethical assault on the environmental advo-
cate, who serves an important role in our system of environmental law.13
Rather, this Article offers a word of realpolitik guidance to their lawyers,
and attempts to demonstrate the significance of those lawyers’ duty to
serve as advisor. Given the current political landscape, environmental
lawyers should advise their clients to be cautious about their advocacy
and judicious about engaging the judiciary.
I. IN THEORY: THE DISCRETIONARY DUTY AS ADVISOR
The legal profession has long acknowledged the need for lawyers to
serve not just as advocates, but also as advisors.14 In his Fifty Resolutions
in Regard to Professional Deportment (1836), David Hoffman considered
the duty as advisor in the traditional context of litigation, pronouncing
that he would advise his clients not to pursue certain types of cases.15
12 See, e.g., Scott D. Laufenberg, Every Lawyer’s Choice: Representing Repugnant Clients,
22 GPSOLO 22, Oct. 2005, at 22, 24 (describing the consequences that can follow from
taking on a difficult client).
13 Robert R. Kuehn, Shooting the Messenger: The Ethics of Attacks on Environmental
Representation, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 417, 417–18 (2002).
14 See, e.g., DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 755 (2d ed. 1846) (containing
Resolution 14, which states that: “[m]y client’s conscience, and my own, are distinct entities:
and though my vocation may sometimes justify my maintaining as facts, or principles, in
doubtful cases, what may be neither one nor the other, I shall ever claim the privilege of
solely judging to what extent to go”).
15 Resolution 11 states:
If, after duly examining a case, I am persuaded that my client’s claim or
defence (as the case may be) cannot, or rather ought not, to be sustained,
I will promptly advise him to abandon it. To press it further in such a
case, with the hope of gleaning some advantage by an extorted com-
promise, would be lending myself to a dishonorable use of legal means,
in order to gain a portion of that, the whole of which I have reason to
believe would be denied to him both by law and justice.
Id. at 754.
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The Canons of Ethics (1908) later distinguished between the duty as advo-
cate and duty as advisor,16 and eventually, the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (1969) recognized that the duty as advisor transcends liti-
gation. Canon 7-3 of the Model Code explicitly acknowledged the different
roles of the lawyer as both advocate and advisor:
Where the bounds of law are uncertain, the action of a law-
yer may depend on whether he is serving as advocate or
adviser. A lawyer may serve simultaneously as both advo-
cate and adviser, but the two roles are essentially different.
In asserting a position on behalf of his client, an advocate
for the most part deals with past conduct and must take the
facts as he finds them. By contrast, a lawyer serving as ad-
viser primarily assists his client in determining the course
of future conduct and relationships.17
Canon 7-5 further emphasized the need for the lawyer, as advisor, to con-
sider the practical effects of legal actions: “[a] lawyer as adviser furthers
the interest of his client by giving his professional opinion as to what he be-
lieves would likely be the ultimate decision of the courts on the matter at
hand and by informing his client of the practical effect of such decision.”18
A. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Currently, the American Bar Association’s Model Rule 2.1 codifies
the lawyer’s duty as advisor, and reinforces the distinction between the
lawyer’s advisory and advocacy roles. In fact, recognizing the broad role
that lawyers play in advising their clients, the Model Rules address the
need for the lawyer, as advisor, to consider non-legal matters when pro-
viding advice related to legal representation of a client. “In representing
16 Canon 31, regarding “Responsibility for Litigation,” provides that “[n]o lawyer is obliged
to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client.”
Canons of Ethics, 32 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1159, 1168 (1909); see James M. Altman, Considering
the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2458 (2003).
17 The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility continues:
While serving as advocate, a lawyer should resolve in favor of his client
doubts as to the bounds of the law. In serving a client as adviser, a law-
yer in appropriate circumstances should give his professional opinion
as to what the ultimate decisions of the courts would likely be as to the
applicable law.
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 (1980).
18 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5 (1980).
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a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and
render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to
law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political
factors that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”19
This rule allows lawyers to advise clients on a broad range of non-
legal concepts.20 Scholars have applied Rule 2.1 to suggest that lawyers
should advise banks of fiduciary risks.21 Others have used it to suggest that
in-house corporate lawyers should temper zealous advocacy with realistic
assessments of liability22 and idealistic assessments of ethical aspirations.23
A few creative thinkers even used the duty as advisor to support a moral
obligation to protect the environment.24 But with a few scholarly excep-
tions calling for mandatory duties to advise clients of dispute resolution
19 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1983).
20 Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, More Than Lawyers: The Legal and Ethical Implications of
Counseling Clients on Nonlegal Considerations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 365, 389 (2005).
21 Christopher G. Sablich, Duties of Attorneys Advising Financial Institutions in the Wake
of the S&L Crisis, 68 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 517, 532 (1992) (“In a bank’s situation, it is critical
that the attorney’s advice be as broad as possible. . . . This is not to say that the attorney
must identify and advise on every possible unsafe and unsound banking practice or poten-
tial breach of duty. Rather, the attorney must identify any such improprieties or imprudent
practices to which she has reasonably been put on notice.”).
22 See Paula Schaefer, Harming Business Clients With Zealous Advocacy: Rethinking The
Attorney Advisor’s Touchstone, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 264 (2011).
23 Ben G. Pender II, Invigorating the Role of the In-House Legal Advisor as Steward in
Ethical Culture and Governance at Client-Business Organizations: From 21st Century
Failures to True Calling, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 91, 108 (2009) (“Model Rules 1.13(a), 2.1, 1.4(a),
1.13(b), and 1.2(d) represent the in-house legal advisor’s bare-minimum ethical obligation
as legal counsel to the client-business organization.”).
24 Some creative scholars have offered alternative interpretations of Model Rule 2.1, sug-
gesting that it serves as a basis for lawyers to advocate for the environment as a moral
responsibility. See Joshua E. Hollander, Fee Shifting Provisions in Environmental Statutes:
What They Are, How They Are Interpreted, and Why They Matter, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
633, 637–38 (2010); Olga L. Moya, Adopting an Environmental Justice Ethic, 5 DICK. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 215, 260, 266 (1996) (proposing a pledge of “allegiance to the Earth and
to the Life it sustains”); Julie Anne Ross, Citizen Suits: California’s Proposition 65 and the
Lawyer’s Ethical Duty to the Public Interest, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 809, 827 (1995) (“Attorneys
who bring citizen suits [under environmental statutes] are fiduciaries of the public
interest.”); Sanford M. Stein & Jan M. Geht, Legal Ethics for Environmental Lawyers:
Real Problems, New Challenges, and Old Values, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
729, 746 (2002). But by this reasoning, Model Rule 2.1 would also require lawyers to rec-
ognize other perspectives. In other words, if advising clients on moral and social factors
means reminding clients about environmental values—promoting ideas such as the in-
trinsic value of life, the preservation of creation, or the need for the sustainability of earth,
then it must also mean that the lawyers must advise of the potential strong opposition
from countervailing philosophies such as property rights.
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options25 and non-discrimination laws,26 Rule 2.1 is largely reduced to
discretionary and aspirational guidance for lawyers.
The language of Model Rule 2.1 begins with a duty to exercise
judgment, using the term “shall,” but when discussing the duty to render
advice on non-legal matters, the Model Rule twice uses the discretionary
term “may.” The Commentary27 like the Model Rule, also contains many
layers of conditional language, leaving substantial discretion to the attor-
ney. Presumably, such discretion allows the lawyer to adapt to the client’s
needs. After all, some clients might not want to hear non-legal advice from
a lawyer. Yet, Comment 1 to Rule 2.1 is quite clear in acknowledging the
lawyer’s duty to render unpleasant advice:
Scope of Advice
[1] A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing
the lawyer’s honest assessment. Legal advice often involves
unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be dis-
inclined to confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer endeav-
ors to sustain the client’s morale and may put advice in as
25 Marshall J. Breger, Should an Attorney Be Required to Advise a Client of ADR Options?,
13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 457 (2000) (“Despite the risks, many believe that an ADR
consultation rule is worth explicit wording. They want to move ADR from a good idea that
might be useful in some circumstances to a normative requirement of legal practice. The
question then becomes whether the profession wants to go so far in our civil justice system
as to make ADR the default mode for litigation? Will we have to ‘force’ recalcitrant, old-
fashioned attorneys to incorporate ADR into their practices?”); Kristin L. Fortin, Reviving
the Lawyer’s Role as Servant Leader: The Professional Paradigm and a Lawyer’s Ethical
Obligation to Inform Clients About Alternative Dispute Resolution, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
589, 625 (2009) (noting that in Georgia, the duty as advisor is a mandate with respect to
alternative dispute resolution).
26 Samuel A. Marcosson, Client Counseling as an Ethical Obligation: Advising Employers
Before They Discriminate, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 221, 233–34 (2006) (These rules strongly urge
attorneys to refer to “ ‘moral, economic, social, and political factors’ and to try to lead their
clients to a decision that is ‘morally just.’ Of course, these rules are stated in the permissive,
for the attorney ‘may’ do this, and it will ‘often be desirable,’ but it is not required. In the con-
text of compliance with employment discrimination laws, however, I believe that the nature
of the laws themselves has the effect of transforming the permissive into the required, or—
at the very least—has altered the permissive ‘may’ to the recommended ‘should.’ ”).
27 Although the text of Model Rule 2.1 is authoritative in most states, the comments are
a guide to interpretation. See CPR Policy Implementation Comm., State Adoption of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Comments, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
(May 23, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/comments
.authcheckdam.pdf (showing repeated use of the statement that comments “are intended
as guides to interpretation, but the text of each rule is authoritative” for all states except
Texas and Virginia).
32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:25
acceptable a form as honesty permits. However, a lawyer
should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the
prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.
So, pursuant to this comment, a lawyer “may” provide advice as honesty
permits. Some discretion is understandable: advising a drunk driver to
seek alcoholism treatment is entirely appropriate,28 whereas threatening
a client with the wrath of God is not.29 But in general, a lawyer is not man-
dated to give unwelcome advice.30
Like the Code and Canons before it, the Model Rule Commentary
also discusses the lawyer’s duty to advise of “practical” considerations, such
as costs and consequences. Comments 2 and 3, for example, state as follows:
[2] Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little
value to a client, especially where practical considerations,
such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant.
Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be
inadequate.
[3] A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for
purely technical advice. When such a request is made by a
client experienced in legal matters, the lawyer may accept
it at face value. When such a request is made by a client in-
experienced in legal matters, however, the lawyer’s respon-
sibility as advisor may include indicating that more may be
involved than strictly legal considerations.
Again, Comment 2 and Comment 3 empower the lawyer to exercise judg-
ment and to assess the degree to which practical considerations should be
discussed. Comment 2 focuses on whether the non-legal concerns are “pre-
dominant,” and how those considerations might affect others. Comment 3
emphasizes the need to consider the desires and experience of the client,
noting that an inexperienced client may need more advice. Comment 4
(discussed later in this Article) notes the potential need to advise a client
28 Friedman v. Comm’r. of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 834–35 (Minn. 1991).
29 Indeed, lawyers can be disciplined for giving improper or abusive non-legal advice. See,
e.g., Fla. Bar v. Johnson, 511 So.2d 295, 295 (Fla. 1987) (lawyer disciplined for threatening
clients with fear of godly misfortune); Tenn. Formal Op. 96-F-140 (1996) (lawyer cannot
pressure client to forego right not to discuss abortion with her parents).
30 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. (1983).
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to consult members of another profession.31 Comment 5 then repeats
the overall theme, acknowledging the discretion of the lawyer to decide
whether and when to advise the client:
Offering Advice
[5] In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until
asked by the client. However, when a lawyer knows that a
client proposes a course of action that is likely to result in
substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, the
lawyer’s duty to the client under Rule 1.4 [duty of commu-
nication] may require that the lawyer offer advice if the
client’s course of action is related to the representation.
Similarly, when a matter is likely to involve litigation, it
may be necessary under Rule 1.4 to inform the client of
forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reason-
able alternatives to litigation. A lawyer ordinarily has no
duty to initiate investigation of a client’s affairs or to give
advice that the client has indicated is unwanted, but a law-
yer may initiate advice to a client when doing so appears
to be in the client’s interest.32
Given the potential breadth and scope of non-legal issues, codify-
ing the lawyer’s duty as advisor presents a difficult task. Furthermore,
lawyers have limitations on the extent to which they can seek compensa-
tion for their “non-legal” advice, so they have little financial incentive to
consider these matters.33
But the purely discretionary phrasing of Comment 5 frustrates the
ultimate purpose of Rule 2.1.34 The first sentence tells the lawyer not to
31 Comment 4 states as follows:
Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain
of another profession. Family matters can involve problems within the
professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work;
business matters can involve problems within the competence of the
accounting profession or of financial specialists. Where consultation
with a professional in another field is itself something a competent law-
yer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation.
At the same time, a lawyer’s advice at its best often consists of recom-
mending a course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations
of experts.
Id.
32 Id. (italics added).
33 Gantt, supra note 20, at 397.
34 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. (1983).
34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:25
give advice unless asked.35 In the second sentence, even if a lawyer knows
that the legal action is likely to result in substantial adverse legal conse-
quences, then the lawyer still only may be required to offer advice.36 The
third sentence notes that dispute resolution may be available as a litigation
alternative.37 And according to the fourth sentence, an attorney ordinarily
has no duty to offer advice, and may advise a client “when doing so appears
to be in the client’s interest.”38 The emphasis placed upon a lawyer’s dis-
cretion probably goes too far.39
In any exercise of the duty as advisor, a lawyer must consider the
greater goals of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. It is a fun-
damental duty of the lawyer to ensure that the client has granted in-
formed consent.40 As even Comment 1 to Rule 2.1 makes clear, a lawyer
cannot hide behind simplistic technical advice about whether a client can
pursue a given course of action.41 Nor should the lawyer rely solely on
Rule 2.1 to decide what is, or what is not, required, because the lawyer also
possesses duties of competence,42 diligence,43 and communication. Model
Rule 1.4, governing communication—cross-referenced in the third sentence
of Comment 5—states that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.”44 The notion of informed consent is also
35 Id.
36 On the other hand, it is hard to believe that a lawyer can truly know, with certainty, what
moral, economic, social and political factors may be relevant to a client’s situation. The
advisory duty is, by definition, forward looking and uncertain; no lawyer can “know” how
politics will affect a legislature, or how global macroeconomics might affect the availability
of budgeted funds to pay for the implementation of a proposed remedy. Then again, the
definition of knowing, under the Model Rules, also allows for knowledge to be inferred
under the circumstances. For example, Connecticut Formal Opinion 49, commented on a
lawyer’s duty to advise a client (and to request permission to reveal confidential information)
when the lawyer believes that their client is going to commit suicide. Although the lawyer
did not know that the client would commit suicide, the ethics committee still recommended
that the lawyer advise the client to consult with a mental health professional. 74 CONN.
BAR J. 238, 243 (2000).
37 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. (1983).
38 Id.
39 As suggested in Part III.B, this comment should be revised, in part, because at some
point, the Model Rule should be deemed a mandate. See infra Part III.B.
40 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)–(b) (1983).
41 Id. at R. 2.1 cmt. 1.
42 Id. at R. 1.1 (“Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”).
43 ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (1983) (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client.”).
44 Id. at R. 1.4.
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defined by the Model Rules as “the agreement by a person to a proposed
course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate informa-
tion and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available
alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.”45
All in all, even though it repeatedly uses discretionary terms, Model
Rule 2.1 draws a connection between the lawyer’s advisory duties and the
essential and mandatory duty to obtain informed consent from the client.
That connection is made more explicitly in the American Law Institute’s
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.
B. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (“Restate-
ment (Third)”), § 20 (2000), the closest counterpart to Model Rule 2.1, does
not use the term advisor, but states that a lawyer has a “Duty to Inform
and Consult with a Client”:
(1) A lawyer must keep a client reasonably informed about
the matter and must consult with a client to a reasonable
extent concerning decisions to be made by the lawyer under
§§ 21–23.
(2) A lawyer must promptly comply with a client’s reason-
able requests for information.
(3) A lawyer must notify a client of decisions to be made by
the client under §§ 21–23 and must explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation.46
On its face, this provision emphasizes the need for clients to make
“informed decisions.” And, informed decisions require understanding of
non-legal matters, a concept also noted in the Restatement commentary
supporting §20, stating as follows:
e. Matters calling for a client decision. When a client is to
make a decision . . . a lawyer must bring to the client’s atten-
tion the need for the decision to be made, unless the client
has given contrary instructions . . . . In addition to legal con-
siderations, advice properly may include economic, social,
political, and moral implications of the courses of action
45 Id. at R. 1.0(e).
46 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20(1)–(3) (2000).
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open to the client . . . . The lawyer ordinarily must explain
the pros and cons of reasonably available alternatives. The
appropriate detail depends on such factors as the impor-
tance of the decision, how much advice the client wants,
what the client has already learned and considered, and
the time available for deliberation.47
Although the language of the Restatement (Third) commentary,
like Model Rule 2.1, acknowledges lawyer discretion, the rationale be-
hind the lawyer’s duty to consult and advise suggests that the lawyer’s
duty to some clients may be greater than to others, depending upon the
client’s sophistication:
Legal representation is to be conducted to advance the cli-
ent’s objectives . . . but the lawyer typically has knowledge
and skill that the client lacks and often makes or imple-
ments decisions in the client’s absence. The representation
often can attain its end only if client and lawyer share their
information and their views about what should be done.
Articulate and sophisticated clients typically call for fre-
quent communication with their lawyers when a matter is
important to them. The need to communicate and consult
is evident when a decision is entrusted to a client who can-
not make it wisely without a lawyer’s briefing . . . . That
need may also be present even in matters the lawyer is to
decide . . . because the lawyer’s decision must seek the ob-
jectives of the client as defined by the client . . . . Discussion
may cause both participants to change their beliefs about
what should be done. In any event, the client may wish to
take into account the lawyer’s estimate of the probable re-
sults of a course of action.48
The next paragraph of the Restatement (Third) commentary rec-
ognizes that the lawyer’s advice to a client may be of critical importance
in shaping the cause of action that would actually be pursued, because the
client may wish to refrain from at least some available options:
The lawyer’s duty to consult goes beyond dispatching infor-
mation to the client. The lawyer must, when appropriate,
47 § 20 cmt. e (2000).
48 § 20 cmt. b (2000) (emphasis added).
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inquire about the client’s knowledge, goals, and concerns
about the matter, and must be open to discussion of the ap-
propriate course of action. A lawyer should not necessarily
assume that a client wishes to press all the client’s rights to
the limit, regardless of cost or impact on others.49
Moreover, in some circumstances, a lawyer should provide advice to clients
even when the client told the lawyer they do not want it:
The appropriate extent of consultation is itself a proper sub-
ject for consultation. The client may ask for certain infor-
mation (see Comment d) or may express the wish not to be
consulted about certain decisions. The lawyer should ordi-
narily honor such wishes. Even if a client fails to request
information, a lawyer may be obligated to be forthcoming be-
cause the client may be unaware of the limits of the client’s
knowledge. Similarly, new and unforeseen circumstances
may indicate that a lawyer should ask a client to reconsider
a request to be left uninformed.50
Ultimately, the Restatement (Third) states that the lawyer’s decision
as to whether and when to provide additional advice to the client should be
based upon a reasonableness test:
To the extent that the parties have not otherwise agreed, a
standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances de-
termines the appropriate measure of consultation. Reason-
ableness depends upon such factors as the importance of the
information or decision, the extent to which disclosure or
consultation has already occurred, the client’s sophistica-
tion and interest, and the time and money that reporting or
consulting will consume.51
Thus, pursuant to the Restatement (Third) and the Model Rules,
it is clear that lawyers can and in some cases should discuss non-legal
49 § 20 cmt. c (2000).
50 Id.
51 Id.
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matters with their clients.52 The ultimate objectives of the relationship
will be defined by the client. But the lawyer must ensure that the client’s
decisions are based upon informed consent, and the lawyer’s discussion
with the client can shape or alter the client’s decisions, especially in the
context of evaluating risks, consequences and alternatives.53
The importance of informed consent, and the duty to advise a client
on non-legal issues, can be vividly demonstrated by applying the duty as
advisor to actual circumstances.54 For example, some scholars and courts
have discussed the duty as advisor as it affects aspirational notions of ra-
cial harmony55 or theology.56 Others have discussed the duty as advisor
in the context of health law.57 In the context of environmental advocacy,
current events demonstrate a circumstance in which the lawyers have a
mandatory duty to advise. Specifically, if a lawyer knows that an environ-
mental advocacy client’s proposed legal action is likely to trigger a legisla-
tive response and the risk of defunding, reform, or repeal, then the lawyer
has a duty to so advise the client, and cannot stay silent without violating
the duty to obtain informed consent.58
II. IN FACT: ACTIONS AND REACTIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
ADVOCACY
In the corporate context, lawyers often play a role in advising
their clients about how their legal controversies will evolve, not only in the
52 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 cmt. e (2000); MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1983).
53 See generally DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE? 153
(1974); Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
307, 316–18 (1980); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1983) (“[A] law-
yer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . .”).
Maryland included this concept in its own version of Rule 2.1. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980) (“In the final analysis, however, . . . the decision whether to
forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for
the client . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 21 (2000) (Allocating
the Authority to Decide Between a Client and a Lawyer).
54 See MODEL RULES, supra note 40.
55 Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer’s Duty to Work
for the Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REV. 901, 904, 916 (1995).
56 Gordon J. Beggs, Laboring Under the Sun: An Old Testament Perspective on the Legal
Profession, 28 PAC. L.J. 257, 264–65, 271 (1996).
57 See, e.g., infra Part III.B.
58 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 cmt. e (2000); MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1983).
2012] THE DUTY TO ADVISE THE LORAX 39
courtroom, but also in the court of public opinion, and even in the halls of
Congress.59 Environmental advocacy lawyers, like their corporate counter-
parts, need to be equally sophisticated when advising their clients. And
sophistication means, in part, understanding the simple principle that
actions trigger reactions.
Fundamentally, environmental advocacy relies on two types of ac-
tions to achieve influence. One is the citizen suit, through which the envi-
ronmental advocacy community has used litigation, the rule of law, and the
authority of the judiciary to shape public policy. In those judicial forums,
and everywhere else, environmental advocates rely on their words and im-
ages, the art of communication, and attempts to influence and persuade.60
Both tools have been successfully used, but not without consequence.
A. Citizen Suits and the Defunding of Implementation
In the 1960s, creative environmental advocacy lawyers began using
litigation to shape environmental policy.61 In the 1970s, the U.S. Congress
passed an array of federal environmental laws, and states experienced
similar eras of environmental awareness.62 Scholars famously advocated
for trees to have standing to sue.63 Over time, environmental litigants
have effectively used citizen suits to break entirely new legal ground,64
59 Michele Destefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, Installment
One: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1301,
1304 (2009).
60 Joseph H. Hinshaw, Use and Abuse of Demonstrative Evidence: The Art of Jury Persuasion,
40 A.B.A. J. 479, 479 (1954).
61 One of the first environmental cases to be brought by conservation interests was Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. Fed. Power Commission. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
See also A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental “Rule of Law” Litigation, 17 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 245–47 (2000).
62 See, e.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 79–80 (2004).
Florida, for example, passed the transformative Florida Water Resources Act of 1972,
creating new governmental agencies to protect the state’s five major watersheds.
63 See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 464, 470 (1972).
64 A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
LAW 213, 215 (2004) (“The field was created virtually out of whole cloth by a receptive
Judiciary and Congress. In the 1960s, environmental protection was a marginal political
idea. Lawyers followed the great common law tradition left open to socially marginal groups
and pursued a ‘rule of law litigation’ strategy. To discipline public agencies through what
we now call ‘public interest’ litigation, they had to convince courts that something called
environmental law existed, when in fact it did not.”).
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as recently demonstrated by litigation victories in the contexts of climate
change,65 water quality in the Everglades,66 and wildlife protection.67 On
subjects such as the Clean Air Act,68 Clean Water Act,69 the Endangered
65 The arena of climate change litigation demonstrates the special creativity of the environ-
mental advocacy bar, and its ability to shape the law and push for change. In Massachusetts
v. EPA, states, local governments, and environmental organizations petitioned for review
of an order of the Environmental Protection Agency denying a petition for rule-making
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act. 549
U.S. 497, 497–98 (2007). The U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioners had standing
to sue based on injuries related to climate change. Later, in Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v.
Connecticut, the Supreme Court further held that under Massachusetts v. EPA, at least
some plaintiffs had Article III standing to pursue claims for present and future damages
caused by greenhouse-gas-induced global warming. 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2532, 2538 (2011).
Perhaps even more remarkably, the Supreme Court did not find that the Clean Air Act fore-
closed the possibility of litigating under state environmental statutes, leaving the issue
open on remand. And in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, coastal property owners alleged that
oil and energy companies caused emission of greenhouse gasses, contributed to global
warming and added to the ferocity of Hurricane Katrina’s destructive force. 585 F.3d 855,
855 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the landowners had stated
justiciable claims for nuisance, trespass and negligence. Not every case, however, has sur-
vived judicial scrutiny. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d.
863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (Alaska Native village public nuisance claim, alleging corporate
greenhouse gas emissions caused global warming and melting Arctic ice, was barred by the
political question doctrine so plaintiffs lacked standing to sue); California v. Gen. Motors
Corp., No. 06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871, at * 4, 12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (dismissing a
nuisance claim on political question grounds).
66 In Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. EPA, the Tribe forced the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency to review the State of Florida’s Everglades Forever Act, finding it to be
a change in state water quality standards. 105 F.3d 599, 600 (11th Cir. 1997). Years later,
as the case evolved, U.S. District Court Judge Alan Gold found EPA’s review of actions by
the State of Florida to be a “dereliction of duty,” demanded that state and federal officials
appear before him, and eventually imposed an equitable order requiring a rigid schedule
for hundreds of millions of dollars in project construction to improve water quality in the
Everglades. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 04-21448-Civ-Gold, Order
Granting Plaintiffs’ Motions in Part; Granting Equitable Relief; Requiring Parties to Take
Action by Dates Certain (S.D. Fla. 2010), available at http://www.evergladeshub.com/lit
/LEGAL/Gold10-Micco-USA-104cv21448_404.pdf; Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v.
United States, 04-21448-Civ-Gold, Omnibus Order (S.D. Fla. 2011), available at http://
www.evergladeshub.com/lit/LEGAL/Gold11-Micco-USA-1-04cv21448ASG-omnibusOrder
Doc585-110426.pdf.
67 See Patrick Parenteau, Citizen Suits Under the Endangered Species Act: Survival of the
Fittest, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 321, 322 (2004); Ari N. Sommer, Taking the Pit Bull Off the
Leash: Siccing the Endangered Species Act on Climate Change, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
273, 275–76 (2009).
68 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7701 (2006).
69 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376 (2006).
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Species Act,70 the National Environmental Policy Act,71 and even Executive
Orders,72 scholars and case-law continuously demonstrate the use of en-
vironmental laws and litigation as a tool for achieving policy objectives.73
Indeed, environmental advocates will undoubtedly continue to serve an
essential role in balancing our limited resources with the needs of seven
billion people.74
The citizen suit is a powerful tool, a point made particularly evi-
dent in the context of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), the landmark
law protecting species and the ecosystems upon which they depend.75
Under this law, citizens may petition the agencies to list new species as
threatened or endangered.76 The responsible government agencies—the
U.S. Department of Commerce (through the National Marine Fisheries
Service) or the U.S. Department of the Interior (through the Fish and
Wildlife Service)—must promptly act within the ESA’s ambitious one-
year statutory deadlines.77 If the agencies fail to act, the ESA empowers
the citizen groups to litigate,78 and “missed deadline” litigation has been
quite common for decades.79
70 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1543 (2006).
71 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006).
72 See, e.g., Wash. Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Nell
Greenfieldboyce, Complaint Tests Rule Protecting Science from Politics, NPR (Nov. 30,
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/30/142895926/complaint-tests-rule-protecting-science
-from-politics.
73 Christopher Brown, A Litigious Proposal: A Citizen’s Duty to Challenge Climate Change,
Lessons from Recent Federal Standing Analysis, and Possible State-Level Remedies Private
Citizens Can Pursue, 25 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 385, 389, 457 (2010); Jonathan S. Campbell,
Has the Citizen-Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act Exceeded Its Supplemental Birth?, 24
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 305, 305–06, 343 (2000); E. Roberts & J. Dobbins, The
Role of the Citizen in Environmental Enforcement, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, http://
www.inece.org/2ndvol1/roberts.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2012); Ross Macfarlane & Lori
Terry, Citizen Suits: Impacts on Permitting and Agency Enforcement, 11 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV’T 20, 20–21 (1997); Michael Penney, Application of the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine
to Clean Air Act Citizen Suits, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 399, 407, 424–25 (2002); Joseph
T. Phillips, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: Impact, Outcomes, and
the Future Viability of Environmental Citizen Suits, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 1282–83 (2000).
74 Jeffrey D. Sachs, With 7 Billion on Earth, a Huge Task Before Us, CNN OPINION (Oct. 21,
2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/17/opinion/sachs-global-population/index.html.
75 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1543 (2006).
76 See Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions and
Public Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321, 332 (2010).
77 16 U.S.C. § 1540(d)(1) (2006).
78 See Parenteau, supra note 67, at 322.
79 See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the
U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 278, 284 (1993).
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The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) and National Marine
Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) routinely decide upon the fate of many poten-
tially endangered and threatened species. But recent lawsuits and rule-
making petitions filed by environmental advocacy groups could transform
ESA implementation by more than doubling the number of domestic species
listed for protection.80 In 2011, through multiple settlement agreements,
federal agencies and environmental advocacy litigants created a process to
resolve many of the ongoing disputes and petitions related to endangered
or threatened species. One settlement addressed FWS actions related to
270 species,81 a second settlement addressed FWS actions related to 480
more species,82 and a third settlement affected the NMFS and eighty three
more species of coral.83 As demonstrated by these petitions and settle-
ment agreements, non-profit environmental advocacy groups (and their
lawyers) play a critical role in the implementation of the ESA, and in shap-
ing agency priorities.84
80 Consider the following: Congress passed the Endangered Species Act in 1973. By the end
of 2011, according to the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service’s “box score,” the federal government
had listed 1382 domestic species as threatened or endangered. Species Reports, U.S. FWS,
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/Boxscore.do (last updated Nov. 15, 2012). More than
250 additional species are candidates for listing. U.S. FWS, CANDIDATE SPECIES 1 (2011),
available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/candidate_species.pdf. However,
in 2010, two environmental litigation advocacy groups, in just four petitions to the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, sought to list 1643 new endangered or threatened species. Keith
Rizzardi, Bulk Petitions: Breaking the Endangered Species Act, a Few Hundred Species at
a Time? (Updated), ESABLAWG (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.esablawg.com/esalaw/ESBlawg
.nsf/d6plinks/KRII-88H2VY. Information provided to Congress in late 2011 indicates that
the federal agencies are facing a combined total of over 180 pending ESA-related lawsuits.
Doc Hastings, Chairman Hastings: After Two Decades, ESA Should Be Updated to Focus
on Species Recovery, Not Excessive Litigation (Dec. 6, 2011), http://hastings.house.gov
/UploadedFiles /DH_NRC_ESA_statement_12.6.pdf; see also Susan D. Daggett, NGOs as
Lawmakers, Watchdogs, Whistle-Blowers, and Private Attorneys General, 13 COLO. J. INT’L
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 99, 99 (2002).
81 In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig., Misc. Action No. 10-377 (EGS)
MDL Docket No. 2165 (D.D.C. 2011), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/improving
_ESA/joint_motion_re_settlement_approval_FILED.PDF.
82 Id.
83 See Petition to List 83 Coral Species Under the Endangered Species Act, CTR. FOR
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, available at http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/esa/pdf/091020_CBD
_Coral_Petition.pdf; Carolyn Lucas-Zenk, NOAA Given Deadline for Corals’ Endangered
Species Status, WEST HAWAII TODAY (Sept. 27, 2011), http://kona.westhawaiitoday.com
/sections/news/local-news/noaa-given-deadline-corals-endangered-species-status.html.
84 The direct effort by a legislature to defund policy implementation is just one potential
budgetary consequence that can result from environmental litigation or advocacy. In other
instances, success may mean nothing more than a reprogramming, or worse yet a reduc-
tion in agency resources. Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, in some cases where
2012] THE DUTY TO ADVISE THE LORAX 43
To some degree, the advocacy is highly effective. Acknowledging
the burgeoning controversy over the Endangered Species Act, academic
studies recently explored the efficacy of the statute. One well-publicized
Emory University study concluded that citizen petitions were especially
effective at leading to the listing of particular species.85 On the other hand,
a competing analysis prepared by University scholars in Idaho concluded
that ESA litigation accomplishes little for the species, because the threats
remained in place, and because the financial resources to support the con-
tinued protection of the species were inadequate.86
Regardless of which perspective is correct, Congress, prodded by
the ultimate consequences of this environmental advocacy, is increasingly
establishing environmental policy with budgetary riders and appropria-
tions acts.87 The prestigious National Bureau of Economic Research has
acknowledged the emerging perception of environmental regulation as a
“job-killing” and “luxury” item.88 Some state and federal legislatures, un-
able to balance the books, do not view the environment as a top priority;
environmental litigants are the prevailing party, they can recover attorney’s fees. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d) (2006). However, the fees recovered come from the agency’s budget. As a result,
money paid to the litigants is money not available for agency implementation. Moreover,
that money comes from somewhere, and other agency priorities may be re-evaluated. See
also Michael J. Mortimer & Robert W. Malmsheimer, The Equal Access to Justice Act
and US Forest Service Land Management: Incentives to Litigate?, J. FORESTRY 352, 352
(Sept. 2011), available at http://www.safnet.org/documents/jof006112696p.pdf; Joshua E.
Hollander, Fee-Shifting Provisions in Environmental Statutes: What They Are, How They
Are Interpreted, and Why They Matter, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 633, 638 (2010); Julie Ann
Ross, Citizen Suits: California’s Proposition 65 and the Lawyer’s Ethical Duty to the Public
Interest, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 809, 827 (1995).
85 Carol Clark, Democracy Works for Endangered Species Act, ESCIENCECOMMONS (Aug. 16,
2012), http://esciencecommons.blogspot.com/2012/08/democracy-works-for-endangered
-species.html. The analysis compared listings of “endangered” and “threatened” species ini-
tiated by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, to those initiated by citizen petition, and found
that citizens, on average, do a better job of selecting threatened species. “That’s a really
interesting and surprising finding,” said co-author Berry Brosi, a biologist and professor
of environmental studies at Emory University. Id.
86 See Dale. D. Goble et al., Conservation Reliant Species, 10 BIOSCIENCE 869, 869–70, 872
(2012) (noting that the ESA lists 1400 species as endangered, but as many as 84 percent of
currently listed species with management plans will face threats to their biological recovery
even after they are considered “recovered” under the act).
87 Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in
Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 619 (2006).
88 Matthew E. Kahn & Matthew J. Kotchen, Environmental Concern and the Business
Cycle: The Chilling Effect of Recession 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 16241, July 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16241; see also Joseph
Perkins, Jobs Killed by Unendangered Species, THE EXAMINER (Nov. 6, 2011), available
at http://www.sfexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/2011/11/jobs-killed-unendangered-species.
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indeed, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Department
of the Interior and even the National Park Service have all been targeted
by the U.S. Congress for substantial budget cuts.89 And routinely, in the
specific arena of ESA implementation, Congress caps expenditures on im-
plementation activities,90 a maneuver that exacerbates the problems and
delays that motivated the citizen suits in the first place.91
Recently, Congress chose more radical ways to use its budgetary
tools and to manage ESA litigation. Weary of the endless litigation over the
protection of the gray wolf,92 Congress delisted the species in some states,
89 See Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Adm’r Lisa P. Jackson, Remarks at the UC–
Berkeley Center for Law, Energy and the Environment, as Prepared (Nov. 3, 2011),
available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/8d49f7ad4bbcf4ef852573590040b7f6
/3ad3632d3919b19b8525793e004ff1b0!OpenDocument; see also Nicole Blake Johnson,
Spending Bill Deals Steep Budget Cuts to EPA, Interior, FED. TIMES (July 13, 2011),
http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20110713/AGENCY01/107130305/.
90 See Jason M. Patlis, Riders on the Storm, or Navigating the Crosswinds of Appropriations
and Administration of the Endangered Species Act: A Play in Five Acts, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
257, 260 (2003).
91 In fact, litigation tactics related to the “critical habitat” provisions of the Endangered
Species Act ultimately led Congress to change the laws, defeating the very objectives sought
by environmental litigators. Buried by litigation over missed deadlines (a troubling reality
with both good and bad explanations), the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service argued in response
that their delays in designating critical habitat for endangered species was caused by the
litigation, and that the courts were setting the agencies’ priorities for them. Congress re-
sponded by capping the total funding available for the agency to work on critical habitat
designations. That solution ultimately deprived the species, and defeated the very objective
sought by the wildlife litigators in the first place. See, e.g., Testimony of Craig Manson,
Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, Department of the Interior, Before the
House Resources Committee, Regarding H.R. 2933, The Critical Habitat Reform Act of 2003
(April 28, 2004):
Simply put, the listing and critical habitat program is now operated in a
“first to the courthouse” mode, with each new court order or settlement
taking its place at the end of an ever-lengthening line. We are no longer
operating under a rational system that allows us to prioritize resources
to address the most significant biological needs . . . . In short, litigation
over critical habitat has hijacked the program.
Id.; see also, e.g., PAMELA BALDWIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20263, THE ROLE OF DES-
IGNATION OF CRITICAL HABITAT UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (July 16, 1999),
available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/biodiversity/biodv-36.cfm; Amy Hagen &
Karen Hodges, Resolving Critical Habitat Designation Failures: Reconciling Law, Policy,
and Biology, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 399 (2006).
92 In cases involving the protection of the wolf, the courts, at times, showed less deference
to the agencies. In Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Kempthorne, despite finding statutory lan-
guage on “distinct population segments” to be ambiguous, the court refused to defer to the
agency and struck down delisting of a Western Great Lakes gray wolf population within a
broader listing. 579 F. Supp. 2d 7, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2008). In Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar,
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thereby removing protection and in theory, eliminating the lawsuits, too.93
Emboldened by that decision, many members of the U.S. Congress went
further in 2011, seeking to entirely defund the process for the listing of any
new species for ESA implementation—a budgetary tactic environmental-
ists decried as “the extinction rider.”94 The initiative failed, but it made a
powerful statement.
Congress also noticed other examples of ESA litigation and the
multiple settlement agreements. In December 2011, the U.S. House of
Representatives held an oversight hearing, inviting the Executive Direc-
tor of the Center for Biological Diversity to discuss “The Endangered
Species Act: How Litigation is Costing Jobs and Impeding True Recovery
another court held that FWS violated the ESA by partially removing protections for distinct
population segments of the gray wolf in the Rocky Mountain, and then further held that the
ESA unambiguously prohibits FWS from listing or delisting only part of a distinct popu-
lation segment. 729 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 (D. Mont. 2010). In Defenders of Wildlife v.
Salazar, that court also rejected a proposed settlement that would have delisted the wolves
in Montana and Idaho, relying upon the logic of its prior opinion. 2011 WL 1345670 (D.
Mont. 2011). Finally, in Wyoming v. Dep’t of Interior, yet another court held FWS acted
arbitrarily and capriciously by rejecting Wyoming’s effort to protect only part of the wolf
population in the state. 2010 WL 4814950 (D. Wyo. 2010) (describing that FWS wanted the
entire state managed as a trophy game area). While the Congressional delisting rider
eventually responded to these decisions, Congress did not amend the ESA. So, arguably,
Congress ordered FWS to reissue a final rule in direct contradiction with other court orders.
See also Erin Furman, Quick Summary of Gray Wolf Legal Challenges: 2005 to Present,
ANIMAL LEGAL AND HISTORICAL CENTER (2011), http://www.animallaw.info/topics/tabbed
%20topic%20page/spusgraywolf2005.htm; W. Ryan Stephens, Note, Gray Wolf Rising: Why
the Clash Over Wolf Management in the Northern Rockies Calls for Congressional Action
to Define “Recovery” Under the Endangered Species Act, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 917 (2012).
93 See, e.g., Phil Taylor, Budget’s Wolf Delisting Opens Pandora’s Box of Species Attacks,
Enviro Groups Warn, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011
/04/13/13greenwire-budgets-wolf-delisting-opens-pandoras-box-of-s-99159.html; Steve
Davies, Congress’s Role in Wolf Delisting Challenged in Court, ENDANGERED SPECIES AND
WETLANDS REPORT (May 6, 2011), http://www.eswr.com/2011/05/congresss-role-in-wolf
-delisting-challenged-in-court/. For earlier litigation history and related agency actions,
see also Rob Dubuc, The Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Delisting: What Would Leopold
Think?, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 215, 215 (2009); Jesse H. Alderman, Crying Wolf:
The Unlawful Delisting of Northern Rocky Mountain Gray Wolves From Endangered Species
Act Protections, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1195 (Sept. 2009).
94 See Paul Quinlan & Jean Chemnick, Democrats’ Bids to Shield EPA Climate Regs,
ESA Listings Fail (July 12, 2011), http://moran.house.gov/democrats-bids-shield-epa
-climate-regs-esa-listings-fail; see also House Votes Down ‘Extinction Rider’ That Would
Have Halted Spending to Protect New Species Under the Endangered Species Act, CENTER
FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2011
/extinction-rider-07-27-2011.html.
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Efforts.”95 After that hearing, the presiding committee chairman an-
nounced his plan for more hearings, and his own vision for ESA reform.96
In partial response to the criticisms set forth by Congress, the Center for
Biological Diversity undertook its own study of the ESA, concluding that
the statute worked well and that listed species simply needed sufficient
time to achieve the recovery objectives.97 In a separate but equally respon-
sive statement, the FWS also offered a moderate tone, de-emphasizing
the impact of ESA litigation.98
Ultimately, in the 2012 budgetary process, Congress proposed bud-
get cuts of more than twenty percent for core ESA programs within FWS,
and cuts of as much as thirty-nine percent to protected species programs
within NMFS.99 The Congressional Research Service report on the current
95 Rob Hotakainen, U.S. Rep Doc. Hastings Ready to Tackle Endangered Species Act, THE
NEWS TRIB. BLOG (Nov. 28, 2011, 8:38 AM), http://blog.thenewstribune.com/politics/2011
/11/28/u-s-rep-doc-hastings-ready-to-tackle-endangered-species-act/.
96 Doc Hastings, Chairman Hastings: After Two Decades, ESA Should Be Updated to
Focus on Species Recovery, Not Excessive Litigation (Dec. 6, 2011), http://hastings.house
.gov/UploadedFiles/DH_NRC_ESA_statement_12.6.pdf (“Today’s hearing is the first of sev-
eral this Committee will hold over the next year to examine and review the Endangered
Species Act. Enacted in 1973 and last reauthorized in 1988, the ESA’s fundamental goal
is to preserve, protect and recover key domestic species . . . . In my opinion, one of the
greatest obstacles to the success of the ESA is the way in which it has become a tool for
excessive litigation. Instead of focusing on recovering endangered species, there are
groups that use the ESA as a way to bring lawsuits against the government and block
job-creating projects.”).
97 See Press Release, The Center for Biological Diversity, Study: 90 Percent of Species
Recovering on Time (May 17, 2012), available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news
/press_releases/2012/esa-success-southeast-05-17-2012.html (explaining that the Center
for Biological Diversity’s “analysis of 110 endangered species finds that 90 percent, includ-
ing many in the Southeast, are on track to meet recovery goals set by federal scientists. The
review examined population trends of plants and animals protected by the Endangered
Species Act in all 50 states, including the Southeast’s red wolves, sandhill cranes, gray bats
and Tennessee coneflowers. . . . [T]he analysis finds species on a positive trajectory toward
recovery—and in some cases, exceeding expectations”).
98 See Laura Petersen, Lawsuits Not Hurting ESA, Says FWS Director, RED LODGE
CLEARINGHOUSE (July 5, 2012), http://rlch.org/news/lawsuits-not-hurting-esa-says-fws
-director. “On the scale of the challenges that we face implementing the Endangered
Species Act, litigation doesn’t even show up on the radar screen,” FWS Director Daniel
M. Ashe said. Id. He added “Can I get frustrated at [Center for Biological Diversity] and
WildEarth Guardians, or my good friend Jamie Clark at Defenders [of Wildlife] when they
decide to sue us? Yeah, I can . . . . But on balance, I think it’s a strength for the Endangered
Species Act, and not a weakness.” Id. (alteration in original).
99 EUGENE H. BUCK ET AL., THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) IN THE 112TH CONGRESS:
CONFLICTING VALUES AND DIFFICULT CHOICES 18–19 (June 14, 2012), available at http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41608.pdf; see also Lucia Graves, House Republicans Take Aim
at Environmental Regulations as Debt Crisis Looms, THE HUFFINGTON POST (July 25, 2011),
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112th Congress also identified twenty more different legislative and budget-
ary proposals that sought to modify ESA implementation in some way.100
Thus, Congress can and will use appropriations bills to explicitly reject
outcomes achieved in U.S. District Court litigation, with the additional
prospect of rendering any ongoing litigation moot.101
These types of budgetary alterations to the implementation of
environmental law and policy are emerging in the states as well. North
Carolina,102 Pennsylvania,103 and Texas104 downsized their environmental
budgets.105 Minnesota legislators battled over the same issues.106 In Florida,
the budget-cutting approach was especially noteworthy. The state cut $20
million from Everglades’ restoration,107 and budgets for the state’s water
management districts. Despite their important responsibilities for flood
control, management of watershed pollution and water supplies were dra-
matically downsized by more than thirty percent.108 Notwithstanding the
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/25/republicans-criticize-environmental
-regulations_n_909138.html.
100 This report emphasized the budgetary issues: “Appropriations play an important role
in the ESA debate, providing funds for listing and recovery activities as well as financing
consultations that are necessary for federal projects. In addition, appropriations bills have
served as vehicles for some changes in ESA provisions.” Id. at 17.
101 See, e.g., Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 619 F.3d
1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction over disputed bridge
in Everglades based on an interpretation of language in an appropriations rider).
102 In North Carolina, legislators dramatically cut the state environmental agency’s budget.
Leslie Kaufman, G.O.P. Push in States to Deregulate Environment, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/16/science/earth/16enviro.html?_r=1.
103 See, e.g., Donald Gilliland, State Budget Cuts Deeper into Environmental Funding, THE
PATRIOT-NEWS (June 29, 2011, 10:04 AM), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf
/2011/06/state_budget_cuts_deeper_into.html.
104 Kate Galbraith, Texas Forest Service Battles Fires, Budget Cuts, THE TEXAS TRIB.
(Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.texastribune.org/texas-environmental-news/environmental
-problems-and-policies/texas-forest-service-battles-fires-budget-cuts/.
105 Kaufman, supra note 102.
106 Stephanie Hemphill, Governor, Legislature Headed for Collision over the Environment,
MPR NEWS (May 20, 2011), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/05/19
/environment-legislation/.
107 See, e.g., Greg Allen, Florida Budget Woes Mean Environmental Cuts, NPR (May 6,
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/05/06/135963420/florida-budget-woes-mean-environmental
-cuts; see also John Miller, Environmental Programs Fall Victim to Budget Cuts, BOSTON
(Nov. 26, 2011), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2011/11/26/environmental
_programs_fall_victim_to_budget_cuts/.
108 Curtis Morgan, Former Water Board Members Urge Scott to Restore Funding, MIAMI
HERALD (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/09/18/3008915/former-water
-board-members-urge.html. Although agency officials wore a brave face and emphasized
“a return to core mission,” there was no legislative debate over good programs or bad ones;
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state’s susceptibility to sea level rise and a recently enacted law,109 the
Florida Department of Environmental Protection is not pursuing any pro-
grams or projects regarding climate change110 (and some Florida legislators
now want to repeal statutory references to the term).111 And finally, in
Arizona, environmental advocates decried budgetary riders that have, in
effect, repealed environmental laws.112
B. The Advocacy Tone, and Its Echo
At times, and perhaps in partial response to the frustration of the
budgetary issues, the environmental litigation organizations adopt an es-
pecially sharp tone in their communications. In a striking example, the
Center for Biological Diversity (“CBD”), a lead plaintiff in hundreds of fed-
eral citizen suits based on the ESA, began a new initiative in 2007.113 The
“Rubber Dodo Award” is presented annually “to a deserving individual in
public or private service who has done the most to drive endangered species
extinct.”114 To some extent, such statements reflect the accepted intensity
rather, the decision was framed as entirely financial. Bruce Ritchie, Water Management
Districts’ Reserve Funds Drying Up, Senate Panel Told, THE FLORIDA CURRENT (Oct. 5,
2011), http://www.thefloridacurrent.com/article.cfm?id=24858910 (The author of this
Article was an employee of the South Florida Water Management District.).
109 Florida Climate Protection Act, FLA STAT. § 403.44; see also Executive Order 07-128
(July 13, 2007), http://www.flclimatechange.us/ewebeditpro/items/O12F15075.pdf (Establish-
ing the Florida Governor’s Action Team on Energy and Climate Change).
110 Craig Pittman, Once a Major Issue in Florida, Climate Change Concerns Few in
Tallahassee, TAMPA BAY TIMES (May 16, 2011), available at http://www.tampabay.com
/news/environment/article1169860.ece.
111 See, e.g., Bruce Ritchie, Committee Bill Would Remove Climate Change Language in
State Law, FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTS (Apr. 8, 2010), http://bruceritchie.blogspot.com/2010
/04/committee-bill-would-remove-climate.html; PCB EUP 10-06 Economic Incentives for
Energy Initiatives, available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc
.aspx?PublicationType=Committ&CommitteeId=2472&Session=2010&DocumentType=
Proposed%20Committee%20Bills%20(PCBs)&FileName=PCB%20EUP%2010-06.pdf.
112 Pete Aleshire, Groups Protest Backdoor Repeal of Host of Environmental Laws, PAYSON
ROUNDUP (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.paysonroundup.com/news/2011/aug/02/groups-protest
-backdoor-repeal-host-environmental-/ (discussing how “[r]iders attached to unrelated bills
would strip protections for Colorado River, Rim Country wilderness areas and endan-
gered species”).
113 Secretary of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne Wins 2007 Rubber Dodo Award, CTR. FOR
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (Aug. 24, 2007), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/PRESS
/kempthorne-08-24-2007.html.
114 Id. In 2008, another environmental litigation organization, Wild Earth Guardians,
upon learning that President Barack Obama intended to nominate Senator Ken Salazar
as Secretary of the Interior, issued an equally harsh critique: “[w]e needed a watchdog to
protect endangered species. In Salazar, we’re afraid we got a lapdog.” See Keith Rizzardi,
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of environmental policy debates.115 Some people might even consider the
Rubber Dodo Award a fairly tame political statement.116
Environmental advocacy is inextricably connected to the art of com-
munication. Achievement of environmental policy objectives necessitates
successful communication at both the local and national level.117 But the
often hostile tone of that lawyer advocacy can also have effects.118 It shapes
the language and the emotions of the public dialogue, and it is preserved in
the filings submitted to and ruled upon by the courts. Of course, it has a
broad range; some groups moderate their tone, others push to extremes.119
In general, “hard” advocacy communications appeal to the public, to the
powerful, to the law, and even to God, and may contain a combination of
potent language, even anger.120 “Soft” advocacy communications might
consist of a public awareness campaign, seeking to gain positive media
coverage over time, or even a cooperative or consensus-driven approach
of uniting otherwise adversarial interests.121
FWS Denies Listing for 270 Species Based on Insufficient Information; Organization that
Filed the Petition Already Skeptical of Incoming Administration, ESABLAWG (Jan. 7, 2009),
http://www.esablawg.com/esalaw/ESBlawg.nsf/d6plinks/KRII-7N37YN (citing Wild Earth
Guardians’ press release).
115 See ROBERT PAEHLKE AND DOUGLAS TORGERSON, MANAGING LEVIATHAN: ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2005); see also Glenn Hurowitz, Interior Secretary
Kempthorne Gets Award for Record Refusal to Protect Endangered Species, GRIST (Aug. 29,
2007, 12:04 PM), http://grist.org/article/dirks-dodo/.
116 Civil disobedience by Greenpeace, for example, would be mainstream when compared
with the radical environmental activism of the Environmental Liberation Front (“ELF”), a
group advocating arson and the destruction of new developments and car dealerships. CRAIG
ROSEBRAUGH, BURNING RAGE OF A DYING PLANET: SPEAKING FOR THE EARTH LIBERATION
FRONT (2004).
117 Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Law, Media, and Environmental Policy: A Fundamental Linkage
in Sustainable Democratic Governance, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 511, 518 (2006).
118 Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Shooting from the Lip: United States v. Dickerson,
Role [Im]morality, and the Ethics of Legal Rhetoric, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000) (“Legal
rhetoric is often over-bearing, even hostile. It employs misdirection and omission, distorts
opposing views, ridicules or vilifies opponents, and uses these and other verbal strategies
to make arguments that are not convincing even to the speaker. This aggressive and decep-
tive behavior is plainly inconsistent with the universal moral imperative of respect for all
persons. . . . The persona of the court, like that of any author, is revealed in the tone of voice
the author adopts and the attitudes the author assumes toward materials and sources,
the content of the text, and the parties involved.”).
119 See, e.g., Rosebraugh, supra note 116.
120 An Introduction to Advocacy, BAPTIST WORLD AID AUSTRALIA, available at http://www
.catalystonline.org.au/papers/introduction_to_advocacy.pdf.
121 See, e.g., Gary Demuth, Effort to Stress the Value of Art, SALINA J. (Sept. 22, 2011),
http://www.saljournal.com/news/story/Arts-Initiative-9-22; see also Jim Shore & Jerry
Straus, The Seminole Water Rights Compact and the Seminole Indian Land Claims
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Either way, the judiciary cannot escape the advocacy. Following
Newton’s laws of motion, actions of environmental advocates spawn equal
but opposite reactions. On the left, environmental litigators like Earth-
justice, with the slogan “[b]ecause the Earth needs a good lawyer,” boldly
embrace an integrated approach to law and policy in our courts.122 On the
right, the Pacific Legal Foundation calls itself the “representative in the
courts for Americans who have grown weary of overregulation by big gov-
ernment [and] overindulgence by the courts.”123 Continuing an American
tradition, lawsuits thus serve as policy debates, generating press releases
and fundraising opportunities, and forcing the courts to reach conclusions
on matters that remain unresolved by the other branches of government.124
While the courts may be part of the policy battle, the judges them-
selves usually seek to avoid the rhetorical and political debates.125 Courts
have long ruled that courts should not be probing the mental process of
the administrative decision-makers,126 and that federal agencies need not
Settlement Act of 1987, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (1990); Dan Charles, How Two Bitter
Adversaries Hatched a Plan to Change the Egg Business, NPR (Feb. 10, 2012), http://m.npr
.org/news/front/146635596?singlePage=false. For more on the lawyer’s role in the con-
sensus building process, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder:
Ethics for a New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63, 65 (2002), available at http://scholarship
.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/173.
122 See EARTHJUSTICE, http://www.earthjustice.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
123 J. D’Agostino, Conservative Spotlight: Pacific Legal Foundation, HUMAN EVENTS
(Nov. 4, 2004), https://www.humanevents.com/2004/11/04/conservative-spotlight-pacific
-legal-foundation/.
124 Alexis de Tocqueville would be most proud. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,
478 (1975) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (“Scarcely any political question arises in the United
States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question”) (quoting ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 98, 280 (Phillips Bradley ed. 1956)).
125 In litigation related to the Everglades, even the long admired Judge William Hoeveler—
an accomplished jurist whose name accompanies The Florida Bar’s distinguished award
for professionalism—fell victim to the excesses. In an interview with the press, Judge
Hoeveler made the mistake of openly criticizing proposed legislation not even before him
as “clearly defective.” His words later forced his recusal from the Everglades cases. Years
of presiding over the intense disputes in the River of Grass finally took their toll. Craig
Pittman, Judge in Glades Case Removed, ST. PETE TIMES (Sept. 24, 2003), http://www
.sptimes.com/2003/09/24/State/Judge_in_Glades_case_.shtml.
126 In United States v. Morgan, the Supreme Court gave appropriate respect to the leaders
of the Executive branch, holding that:
[c]abinet officers charged by Congress with adjudicatory functions are
not assumed to be flabby creatures, any more than judges are. Both
may have an underlying philosophy in approaching a specific case.
But both are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual disci-
pline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its
own circumstances.
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limit their decisions to solely apolitical factors.127 Indeed, most efforts to
turn every internal disagreement among government staffers into an “ah-
ha” opportunity fail.128 In other words, framing the issue in the context
of separation of powers, the judiciary has recognized that the Senators
in the legislative branch and the bureaucrats in the executive branch are
not the enemy of the environment; rather, they are representatives of
their constituents.129
313 U.S. 409, 421 (1991). In fact, the Court expressed its frustration with the lower court
proceedings that allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to be deposed.
[T]he short of the business is that the Secretary should never have been
subjected to this examination . . . such an examination of a judge would
be destructive of judicial responsibility. We have explicitly held in this
very litigation that “it was not the function of the court to probe the men-
tal processes of the Secretary.” . . . Just as a judge cannot be subjected to
such a scrutiny . . . so the integrity of the administrative process must be
equally respected. . . . It will bear repeating that, although the adminis-
trative process has had a different development and pursues somewhat
different ways from those of courts, they are to be deemed collaborative
instrumentalities of justice, and the appropriate independence of each
should be respected by the other.
Id. at 422 (internal citations omitted).
127 Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d 515, 523 (9th Cir.
1998).
128 See Nat’l Fisheries Inst. v. Mosbacher, 732 F. Supp. 210, 227 (D.D.C. 1990) (“That the
administrative record . . . reflects a certain amount of disagreement among the countless
individuals involved in developing or commenting on the [Fisheries Management Plan] is
inevitable and indicates that the debate was as open and vigorous as Congress intended.”).
129 Consider, for example, the behavior of one environmental attorney, chastised by a U.S.
District Court Judge:
Cases that implicate a subject so dear to many, such as the continued
existence of Florida’s magnificent panther, tend to excite undue excess.
In this case, counsel for the plaintiff has assumed an unusually aggres-
sive stance. First, she suggests that United States Senator Bob Graham
has intervened feloniously in an unseemly attempt to thwart her effort to
salvage the Florida panther. This suggestion is illogical and regrettable.
To say the absolute least, Senator Graham is not widely known as a com-
mitted enemy of Florida’s environment in general or Florida’s panthers in
particular. Senator Graham is a public official of long and distinguished
service. Whether one agrees or disagrees with him on some particular
matter, one cannot reasonably doubt his integrity, especially if the doubt
arises from a letter reporting secondhandedly that he merely inquired
with the Attorney General of the United States respecting the status of
a matter affecting his constituents. This court will not countenance any
inquiry, as suggested by counsel for the plaintiffs, into the bona fides
of Senator Graham’s official activity.
The Fund for Animals v. Rice, Case No. 94-1913-CIV-T-23E (M.D. Fl. 1995). Notably, this
court opinion shows how the judiciary can get caught up in professionalism lapses as well.
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Still, the language and tactics used in the courtroom can have ef-
fects outside. In the public, opponents of the environmentalism movement,
like the ranchers in the Klamath basin in Oregon, have used protests and
civil disobedience when endangered species litigation led to the cutting
off of the ranchers’ water supplies.130 And even within the government,
nuanced countertactics have emerged, like the naming of policies related
to environmental affairs—the “Clear Skies Act” or the “Healthy Forests
Initiative”—to disguise the policy objective.131 One recent example of gov-
ernment abuse was especially disturbing, with a senior policy official fun-
damentally compromising scientific integrity by forcing Department of
Interior biologists to rewrite their scientific conclusions to fit her preor-
dained policy framework.132 Exposed by the agency’s Inspector General in
2007, the political interference subsequently forced the agency to reverse
and revisit dozens of decisions pursuant to the ESA.133
Upon further reflection, and after a motion by counsel, the Court above later struck its own
statements. Cleansing the record, however, cannot eliminate the disease, and once the
professionalism of the judiciary is compromised, the rule of law itself becomes suspect.
130 See, e.g., Glen Spain, Dams, Water Reforms, and Endangered Species in the Klamath
Basin, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 49, 78 n. 117 (2007).
131 Considered economically sensible paths to environmental protection by supporters, but
ridiculed as “greenwashing” by opponents, this name game is now politically commonplace.
Compare EPA, CLEAR SKIES ACT OF 2003, available at http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies
/fact2003.html, with NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, DIRTY SKIES: THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION’S AIR POLLUTION PLAN, available at http://www.arizonaenergy.org/News
_06/News%20Jan06/Dirty%20Skies--%20The%20Bush%20Administration%27s%20Air
%20Pollution%20Plan.htm; compare THE WHITE HOUSE, Healthy Forests: An Initiative for
Wildfire Prevention and Stronger Communities, available at http://www.fs.fed.us/projects
/documents/HealthyForests_Pres_Policy%20A6_v2.pdf with Environmental Protection
Information Center, Healthy Forests Initiative: A Campaign of Severe Forest Policy Rollbacks,
http://www.wildcalifornia.org/publications/article-57.
132 Holly Doremus, Harnessing the Power of Information for the Next Generation of Environ-
mental Law—Part II: Use and Abuse of Information, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1614 (2007).
133 See W. Watershed Project v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1185 (D. Idaho
2007) (reversing U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service decision not to list the greater sage grouse);
see also H. Josef Herbert, After the BigMac Attack: Interior’s Mea Culpa, ESABLAWG
(Nov. 27, 2007), http://www.esablawg.com/esalaw/ESBlawg.nsf/d6plinks/KRII-79D3NB
(including links to numerous articles on the subject). Similarly, in 2008, the U.S. Forest
Service was berated by a U.S. District Court judge for its blatant failure to meet judicially
established deadlines to complete the ESA’s “consultation” process, and the Secretary of
Agriculture was nearly held in contempt. Forest Serv., Emps for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 726 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (D. Mont. 2008). In this case, the Forest Service failed
to meet deadlines previously set by the court to consult with the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
on the effects of fire retardant on species each year, and considers chemical fire retardant
an important firefighting tool. Judge Malloy held that
[t]he Forest Service’s position, that if it did not comply with NEPA it
cannot be held in contempt because of circumstances beyond its control,
2012] THE DUTY TO ADVISE THE LORAX 53
In sum, the tone of environmental advocacy, and the words used by
the messengers, can shape the perceptions of and reactions to the mes-
sage. Sometimes, it may even harm the relationship between the environ-
mental advocates and the governmental officials they hope to persuade.
Worse yet, the general public—who in the end are the stakeholders who
shape the democratic support for, or lack of support for, the statutes and
laws the environmental advocates rely upon—are left confused, misled and
maybe angry. So, environmental advocacy becomes exposed to even more
radical consequences.
C. The Risk of Statutory Reform or Repeal
Environmental law is based upon statutes, so by definition, the
shaping of environmental law will consist of cycles of legislation, litigation,
and negotiation.134 A decade ago, it seemed that the Florida Everglades
might add a new dimension to that paradigm, as the federal, state, and
local government officials worked with diverse stakeholders groups to
agree upon a consensus-based negotiation approach to environmental
restoration.135 Instead, in Florida and the nation, the evidence suggests
that the different groups of stakeholders chose radically different paths.
Earth Jurisprudence thinkers seek to codify greater legal rights for the
natural world,136 while others are repealing the legacy of environmental
law.137 Even though our society faces an existential challenge in the form
is duplicitous at best. A straight reading of the record here indicates that
the Forest Service had no intention to comply with the Court’s orders, or,
at the very least—considering its lackluster participation in the consul-
tation process—simply did not care enough about its regulatory and
legal obligations to engage the process in a manner that meaningfully
contributed to it.
726 F. Supp. 2d at 1134; see also Forest Service Nears Contempt, and Court Threatens
Prison for Department of Agriculture Official, ESABLAWG (Feb. 27, 2008), available at
http://www.esablawg.com/esalaw/ESBlawg.nsf/d6plinks/KRII-7BF76J.
134 John J. Fumero & Keith W. Rizzardi, The Everglades Ecosystem: From Engineering to
Litigation to Consensus-Based Restoration, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 667, 673 (2001).
135 Id. at 685.
136 See CENTER FOR EARTH JURISPRUDENCE, http://earthjuris.org/; see also Carole L.
Gallagher, The Movement to Create an Environmental Bill of Rights: From Earth Day,
1970 to the Present, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 107, 108 (1997).
137 Although Part II.C. of this article discusses current examples of efforts to repeal envi-
ronmental laws, a provocative book published in 1996 suggested that an environmental
backlash and massive Congressional reform was already underway. MICHAEL GREVE,
THE DEMISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAW 109 (1996) (“[E]nvironmental politics
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of global climate change,138 political and public support for the concerns of
the environmental advocates has waned to the point of causing some en-
vironmental groups to temper their advocacy.139 Once a celebration, Earth
Day has become a source of social divisiveness.140 In other words, for the
lawyer advising an environmental advocacy client, the budgetary disputes
and the coarse verbal exchanges over the cost of environmental regulation
has undergone a dramatic change, whose themes and directions bear a striking resem-
blance to the demise of environmental values in the case law. Environmentalism has lost
much of its appeal: environmental groups have lost tens of thousands of members. At the
same time, the grass roots property rights movement has grown by leaps and bounds, and
think tanks that influence environmental policies based on property rights and private
markets enjoy increased influence, credibility, and funding. The establishment media
have begun to subject environmental policies and their underlying assumptions to critical
scrutiny.”). Criticism of the book suggested that it was not intended to trace the rise and fall
of excesses in environmental law, but rather, “to advocate the dismantling of twentieth-
century government.” Boyd Thompson, Willful Blindness: The Downfall of the Demise of
Environmentalism in American Law, 10 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 185 (1996).
138 While political leaders debate policies as to the degree of anthropocentric causation,
and the appropriate solutions, and while the precise range of consequences remains un-
predictable, the existence of some degree of global climate change is widely accepted as a
scientific fact. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/;
Climate Change, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/;
Global Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet, NASA, http://climate.nasa.gov/ (last
visited Nov. 15, 2012); Global Warming Fast Facts, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 14, 2007),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/12/1206_041206_global_warming.html;
Peter Gleick, Remarkable Editorial Bias on Climate Science at the Wall Street Journal,
FORBES (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/petergleick/2012/01/27/remarkable
-editorial-bias-on-climate-science-at-the-wall-street-journal/ (noting that “2011 was the 35th
year in a row in which global temperatures were above the historical average” and that
“every national academy of sciences on the planet agrees with the reality and seriousness
of human caused climate change”). Compare Gleick et al., Climate Change and the Integrity
of Science, 328 SCIENCE 689, 689–90 (2010) (signed by 255 scientists), with Claude Allegre
et al., No Need to Panic About Global Warming: There’s No Compelling Scientific Argument
for Drastic Action to ‘Decarbonize’ the World’s Economy, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com
/article/SB10001424052970204301404577171531838421366.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion
_LEADTop (signed by 16 scientists) (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
139 Leslie Kaufman, Environmentalists Get Down to Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at 7
(“On the strategy front, some of these groups are becoming more circumspect in campaign-
ing against global warming, mindful of mixed public sentiment.”). Interestingly, some have
theorized that humans are psychologically hard-wired not to accept science that might
contradict our views. Chris Mooney, The Science of Why We Don’t Believe Science: How Our
Brains Fool Us on Climate, Creationism, and the Vaccine-Autism Link, MOTHER JONES,
June 2011, at 27.
140 See, e.g., KARL BOYD BROOKS, BEFORE EARTH DAY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW, 1945–1970 (2009); Joel A. Mintz, Book Review, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
107, 107 (2010).
2012] THE DUTY TO ADVISE THE LORAX 55
may be minor considerations. Today, when advising clients of moral, eco-
nomic, social, and political factors, the lawyer should also warn of the
potential for reform or repeal of environmental laws.
At the federal level, support for environmental protection has
changed. On the campaign trail, Presidential candidates attacked each
other for previously supported environmental protection initiatives.141
Perhaps most notably, views on climate change and the need for “cap-
and-trade” legislation—deemed by former Vice President Al Gore in 2009
to be “one of the most important pieces of legislation ever introduced in
Congress”—changed dramatically.142 In 2011–2012, the President and
Congress virtually ceased their efforts on the subject,143 and one Presiden-
tial candidate even apologized for his own prior support for the concept,
declaring it “stupid.”144 The fate of cap-and-trade climate change legislation
is not a singular event.
Of course, macro-level debates over the merits of environmental
laws can occur within any of the branches of government: legislative,145
141 See, e.g., Romney & Obama: Carbon Copies, YOUTUBE (Oct. 6, 2011), http://bit.ly/renpjq;
Jonathan Weisman, Romney Environment Push Is Fresh Target for His Rivals, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 6, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702033888
04576613293746516756.html (candidate made repeal of laws requiring energy saving light
bulbs part of a campaign promise); Suzanne Goldenberg, Republican Bill to Repeal Law
That Promotes Energy-Saving Lightbulbs Fades, THE GUARDIAN (July 13, 2011, 12:26 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jul/13/energy-saving-light-bulbs-ban-republican
-bill-fails.
142 Compare Cap and Trade, with Handouts and Loopholes: The First Climate-Change Bill
with a Chance of Passing Is Weaker and Worse than Expected, THE ECONOMIST, May 21,
2009, available at http://www.economist.com/node/13702826, with John M. Broder &
Clifford Krauss, Advocates of Climate Bill Scale Down Their Goals, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26,
2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/science/earth/27climate.html.
143 See Steven Mufson, Vanishing Cap and Trade in Obama’s 2012 Budget, WASH. POST
(Feb. 14, 2011), available at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/post-carbon/2011/02/vanishing
_cap_and_trade_in_oba.html; Chris Good, Almost Every 2012 Republican Has a Cap-and-
Trade Problem, THE ATLANTIC (May 13, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive
/2011/05/almost-every-2012-republican-has-a-cap-and-trade-problem/238776/.
144 See Travis Waldron, Pawlenty’s Apology Papers over His Extensive Support for Cap and
Trade, THINK PROGRESS (May 6, 2011, 12:40 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2011
/05/06/164076/pawlenty-cap-and-trade-apology/.
145 For example, through the Information Quality Act, environmental science itself came
under intense scrutiny, with Congress passing a statute seeking to ensure that challenges
to the quality of science will be heard. See Robert R. Kuehn, Suppression of Environmental
Science, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 333, 349 (2004); Kirk T. O’Reilly, Science, Policy, and Politics:
The Impact of the Information Quality Act on Risk-Based Regulatory Activity at the EPA,
14 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 249, 250 (2007); Lori J. Wolf, Dissecting the Information Quality
Act: A Look at the Act’s Effect on the Florida Panther and Evidentiary Science, 11 ALB. L.
ENVTL. OUTLOOK 89, 109 (2006).
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executive,146 or judicial.147 But the lawyer appearing before the judiciary
can shape the requested remedies, has an opportunity to respond to the
opposition, and can participate in the process on behalf of the client. Simi-
larly, if actions are taken by the executive branch, such as modifications
of enforcement practices or alterations of administrative rules, a lawyer
can usually seek to intervene in the enforcement cases, or participate in
the notice and comment process.148 In contrast, the lawyer representing
In another petty but telling example, Congress abandoned, in 2010, its green initia-
tive of using biodegradable materials in its own cafeteria. Trays and utensils made of
biodegradable corn starch in the Congressional cafeteria disappeared, plasticware and
polystyrene foam plastic coffee cups returned. Suzanne Goldenberg, Republicans Recycle
an Old Idea: The Foam Plastic Coffee Cup, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2011, 4:34 PM), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/28/republicans-foam-coffee-cup-environmentally-bad;
David A. Fahrenthold & Felicia Sonmez, In the House, Compostable Utensils Replaced with
Old-Fashioned Plastic, WASH. POST (March 5, 2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/04/AR2011030406403.html?hpid=topnews.
146 Sometimes, the review and repeal of regulations can involve a combination of the exec-
utive and legislative branches. See, e.g., Note, Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act,
122 HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2163 (2009).
147 Within the judicial branch, scholarly work has suggested that changes in judicial ap-
pointments and judicial education programs are intended to produce changes in envi-
ronmental policy. John D. Echeverria, Changing the Rules by Changing the Players: The
Environmental Issue in State Judicial Elections, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 217, 217–18 (2000);
Douglas T. Kendall & Eric Sorkin, Nothing for Free: How Private Judicial Seminars Are
Undermining Environmental Protections and Breaking the Public’s Trust, 25 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 405, 405–07 (2001).
148 Within the executive branch, agencies can use enforcement discretion and rule-making
authority to reverse prior outcomes. See, e.g., Robert Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the
President Have Directive Authority over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
2487, 2530–32 (2011). The shifting policies between the last three Presidential adminis-
trations demonstrate the practice. Id.
The administration of President George W. Bush settled many Clean Air Act en-
forcement cases begun by President William Clinton’s administration. See Joel A. Mintz,
“Treading Water”: A Preliminary Assessment of EPA Enforcement During The Bush I
Administration, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE—AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY (Apr. 21, 2005) 34 ELR 10912 & SK057
ALI-ABA 183. The shift in enforcement policy triggered high-profile resignations. See also
Eric V. Schaeffer, RESIGNATION LETTER, available at http://www.grist.org/article/top-epa
-offical-resigns. The Obama Administration reversed course, again. See Holly Doremus,
New Life for New Source Review, LEGAL PLANET (Apr. 30, 2009), http://legalplanet.wordpress
.com/2009/04/30/new-life-for-new-source-review/.
The Bush Administration also adopted controversial revised regulations governing
the Endangered Species Act consultation process for evaluating risks to listed species.
See Eric Biber & Cynthia Drew, Stopping the Conversation: Amended ESA Section 7
Regulations Put Species At Risk, 36 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 139, 139–41 (2009) (discussing
the proposed rule changes of 73 Fed. Reg. 47868, with the final rule changes of 73 Fed.
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a local environmental advocacy group probably has less access to Congress
or state legislature (which can rewrite environmental law and policy on
their own).149 The lawyers filing citizen suits, however, must recognize the
influence their efforts can have upon legislative efforts to reform or repeal
environmental laws.
In a 2009 citizen suit, for example, environmental advocates claimed
that Florida’s water bodies were nutrient enriched, and demanded that
the U.S. EPA adopt new nutrient requirements for Florida waters.150 The
subsequent settlement, and its potential consequences for water quality
management, triggered a backlash. In 2011, the proposed Cooperative
Federalism Act sought to fundamentally restructure the relationship be-
tween the state and federal governments, substantially limiting the role
of the EPA implementation of the Clean Water Act.151 A similar but nar-
rower bill—the “State Waters Partnership Act of 2012”—was introduced
Reg. 76272). The Obama administration eventually reversed the rules. See The Endangered
Species Act, MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES, 74
Fed. Reg. 9753 (Mar. 6, 2009). However, when litigation over the listing of the polar bear
created the potential for using the Endangered Species Act as a tool for the regulation of
global climate change, both presidential administrations adopted and defended agency rules
exempting the polar bear from some of the ESA’s essential regulatory provisions, con-
cluding that the ESA was not the proper way to regulate greenhouse gases. See Jessica
Ferrell, Federal Judge Requires USFWS to Conduct NEPA Review of Polar Bear Rule, 280
ENV. COUNS. NEWSLETTER 4, 4 (Dec. 2011).
149 For example, policies can be adopted to provide exemptions or exceptions from the need
to comply with environmental laws. Renee Lewis Kosnik, OIL AND GAS ACCOUNTABILITY
PROJECT, THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY’S EXCLUSIONS AND EXEMPTIONS TO MAJOR ENVI-
RONMENTAL STATUTES 2 (Oct. 2007) (noting that “the oil and gas industry enjoys sweeping
exemptions from provisions in the major federal environmental statutes intended to pro-
tect human health and the environment” including the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; Safe
Drinking Water Act; Clean Water Act; Clean Air Act; National Environmental Policy Act;
and the Toxic Release Inventory under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act), available at http://www.earthworksaction.org/files/publications/Petroleum
Exemptions1c.pdf?pubs/PetroleumExemptions1c.pdf.
150 See Fla. Wildlife Fed. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt., 647 F.3d 1296, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2011).
The author of this Article was counsel for the interveners in this matter. The federal gov-
ernment, after initially defending the suit, reversed course and settled the dispute. Id.
Although the EPA had previously approved Florida’s narrative water quality standards less
than three years earlier, the EPA formally concluded that Florida’s water quality standards
for nutrients must be revised, and a court-ordered consent decree set a deadline for the
federal government to adopt new numeric criteria for the State of Florida. Id.
151 Clean Water Cooperative Federalism Act of 2011, H.R. 2018, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011) (passed by a 239 to 184 vote by the U.S. House of Representatives), http://woodall
.house.gov/event/house-rules-committee-meeting-hr-2018-clean-water-cooperative
-federalism-act-2011.
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in 2012, seeking to reverse the outcome of the Florida litigation and settle-
ment agreement, and prohibiting the EPA from acting independently of the
State of Florida.152 Environmental advocacy actions triggered reactions.
Across the country, on the Pacific coast, environmental advocates
pursued ESA citizen suit litigation to protect the endangered Delta smelt
and other protected salmonid species.153 The Delta smelt is a small, slender-
bodied fish found only in the San Francisco Bay and Sacramento–San
Joaquin Rivers Delta in California (“Bay-Delta”), which has declined to
its lowest-ever observed levels due to entrainment in water export pumps,
competition and predation from exotic fish species, and changes in habitat
and food supply.154 The litigation eventually led to additional conditions
being imposed on the operation of the regional water supply.155 And that
controversial outcome, in turn, led to legislative reactions. The House of
Representative considered repealing agency authority to implement the
ESA’s requirements within the Sacramento Bay Delta.156 For its part, the
State of California has also passed water management reforms.157
These disputes are not limited to the federal government. States
are also enmeshed in these types of philosophical and federalism-based
152 H.R. 3856, 112th Cong. (2d. Sess.). The Florida Legislature also sought to prevent the
EPA from asserting itself, and passed its own law ratifying actions by the State Department
of Environmental Protection, exempting the state agency action from the usual state ad-
ministrative procedure, and further directing the state agency to send the proposed stan-
dards to the EPA. Effective Date for the Water Quality Standards for the State of Florida’s
Lakes and Flowing Waters, 77 Fed. Reg. 29271–29275 (May 17, 2012).
153 The Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases, 1:09-cv-00407 OWW DLB et al., Final Judgment,
Document 851 (E.D. Cal. 2011), available at http://baydelta.files.wordpress.com/2011/04
/851_smelt_final-judgment.pdf.
154 EUGENE H. BUCK ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41608, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT (ESA) IN THE 112TH CONGRESS: CONFLICTING VALUES AND DIFFICULT CHOICES 18–19
(June 14, 2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41608.pdf.
155 Id.
156 Id. (discussing legislative proposals, including Section 308 of H.R. 1287, stating as follows:
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, in connection with the Central Valley
Project, the Bureau of Reclamation and an agency of the State of California operating a
water project in connection with the Project shall not restrict operations of an applicable
project pursuant to any biological opinion issued under the Endangered Species Act of
1973 (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.), if the restriction would result in a level of allocation of water
that is less than the historical maximum level of allocation of water under the project.”).
157 In 2009, responding in part to the years of Delta smelt litigation in the Sacramento Bay
Delta, the California legislature passed its own reform attempting to improve regional
water management. See, e.g., Richard M. Frank, A New Dawn for the Sacramento–San
Joaquin Delta? Assessing the 2009 California Delta/Water Legislation, 37 ECOLOGY L.
CURRENTS 17, 17 (2010).
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disputes over environmental law. In California, a 2010 ballot initiative
sought to suspend the state Global Warming Act of 2006,158 and in 2012,
a new ballot effort seeks to repeal all state environmental laws as uncon-
stitutional.159 In 2011, the Florida Legislature repealed an entire chapter
of growth management laws.160 In Maine, the Governor announced a sixty-
three-point plan to cut environmental regulations.161 In New Hampshire,
twelve different rollbacks or repeals of environmental laws or funding have
been proposed in 2012.162 North Carolina legislators recently suggested
repeal of air quality regulations.163
Yet none of this is truly new; the environmental advocacy commu-
nity has had the chance to learn this lesson in the past.164 Most famously,
when the consequences of the Tellico Dam project threatened the tiny
158 Margot Roosevelt, Global Warming: Ballot Initiative Would Curb California Efforts,
LA TIMES (Jan. 25, 2010), available at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2010
/01/global-warming-ab-32-measure-94-climate-change-schwarzenegger.html.
159 Eric Biber, Tea Party Activist Wants to Repeal All California Environmental Laws,
LEGAL PLANET (Dec. 11, 2011), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/12/11/tea-party
-activist-wants-to-repeal-all-california-environmental-laws/.
160 Property rights advocates declared the change a victory, praising the “ditching of cen-
tralized planning” and promoting the need for “a competitive land supply.” Scott Roberts,
Florida Repeals Smart Growth Law, FREEDOM FOUNDATION (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www
.myfreedomfoundation.com/index.php/site/view/florida_repeals_smart_growth_law.
However, Audubon of Florida had a different view, declaring Florida Governor Rick Scott
to be dishonest, and rejecting the “big lie” that repeal was a necessary step toward economic
recovery. Audubon of Florida Reacts to Gov. Scott’s Approval of Growth Management Repeal,
AUDUBON OF FLORIDA, http://audubonoffloridanews.org/?p=8419 (last visited Nov. 15, 2012)
(explaining that growth management laws that would allow over 1,000,000 new residential
dwellings and over 2.7 billion square feet of commercial, office, and industrial space, enough
new retail, office and industrial space to create over six million new jobs); see also Anthony
Flint, How the Tea Party Is Upending Urban Planning, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 14, 2011),
available at http://www.theatlanticcities.com/politics/2011/12/how-tea-party-upending
-urban-planning/718/.
161 Mike Tipping, LePage Proposals Would Dismantle Maine’s Environmental Legacy,
MORNING SENTINEL (Jan. 30, 2011), http://www.onlinesentinel.com/opinion/columnists
/MIKE-TIPPING-LePage-proposals-would-dismantle-Maines-environmental-legacy-.html.
162 Suzie Hackler, A New Year’s Resolution for the NH Legislature: Kill the Dirty Dozen Bills
of 2012, CONSERVATION NH (Jan. 3, 2012), http://conservationnh.org/water/a-new-year
%E2%80%99s-resolution-for-the-nh-legislature-kill-the-dirty-dozen-bills-of-2012/.
163 Kathleen Sullivan, North Carolina Residents Breathe Toxic Pollution as Politicians Cater
to Major Polluters, S. ENVTL. L. CTR. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.southernenvironment.org
/newsroom/Press_releases/north_carolina_residents_breathe_toxic_pollution.
164 As President Harry S Truman said, “The only thing new in the world is the history you
don’t know.” MERLE MILLER, PLAIN SPEAKING: AN ORAL BIOGRAPHY OF HARRY S TRUMAN
26 (1974).
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snail darter with extinction, environmental advocates obtained a remark-
able ruling:
It may seem curious to some that the survival of a relatively
small number of three-inch fish among all the countless
millions of species extant would require the permanent
halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress
has expended more than $100 million. The paradox is not
minimized by the fact that Congress continued to appro-
priate large sums of public money for the project, even after
congressional Appropriations Committees were apprised of
its apparent impact upon the survival of the snail darter.
We conclude, however, that the explicit provisions of the
Endangered Species Act require precisely that result . . . .
This language admits of no exception.165
Congress promptly enacted an exception. Just months after the
decision, Congress amended the ESA and created a committee (nicknamed
the “God Squad”) to authorize federal actions even if they would jeopardize
the continued existence of a species.166 In other words, the result of a de-
cade of litigation, more than a dozen cases, and a historic U.S. Supreme
Court victory, was the reform of the very law the environmental advocacy
community had relied upon in the first place.167 Simply put, successful en-
vironmental advocacy litigation can and does trigger counterproductive
legislative outcomes.168
165 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978).
166 Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 95-632 (1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536 (2006)); see also David B. Stromberg, The Endangered Species Act Amendments
of 1978: A Step Backwards?, 7 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 33 (1978), available at http://
lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol7/iss1/3.
167 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, More Than Just a Passing Fad: Article: In the Wake of the
Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 805, 808 (1986) (footnote 2 cites more than a dozen cases involving the issue);
Zygmunt J. B. Plater, Tiny Fish, Big Battle: 30 Years After TVA and the Snail Darter
Clashed, the Case Still Echoes in Caselaw, Politics, and Popular Culture, 44 TENN. B. J.
14 (Apr., 2008). In its reform, Congress created new ESA exemptions. Two decades later,
the Clinton administration adeptly used the Habitat Conservation Planning process (to
the dismay of some environmentalists). See, e.g., David J. Sousa & Christopher McCrory
Klyza, New Directions in Environmental Policy Making: An Emerging Collaborative Regime
or Reinventing Interest Group Liberalism?, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 377, 377–79 (2007). We
need to learn the lessons again.
168 Another example of successful litigation generating legislative defeat involved a critically
important concept in the Clean Water Act. Disputing EPA’s rules exempting some point
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So, as this discussion demonstrates, the practice of law and envi-
ronmental advocacy must acknowledge the larger political and budgetary
context. Today, environmental law and policy faces extraordinary bud-
getary and philosophical challenges. That inescapable truth has ethical
implications. Although a swing of the political pendulum might one day
reduce the risks, current events dictate that lawyers who represent envi-
ronmental advocacy clients should advise their clients of moral, economic,
social, and political factors, including the reality that the environmental
laws relied upon by the environmental advocates could be at risk of de-
funding, reform, or even repeal.
III. IN PRACTICE: WHEN THE DUTY TO ADVISE BECOMES MANDATORY
Many committed environmental activists, inevitably, will reject
cautionary advice from counsel, declaring lawsuits and progressive advo-
cacy a strategic necessity. They will insist that only court-ordered mandates
can change the course and overcome extraordinary industry resistance or
governmental inaction.169 And indeed, an environmental advocacy client
who files a petition to list an imperiled species or who pursues a lawsuit
to stop environmental degradation has valid objectives at stake. Still, the
lawyer who represents environmental advocacy clients has an ethical duty
to at least advise the client of “moral, economic, social and political factors
that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”170 That lawyer also must
source agricultural irrigation discharges from National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (“NPDES”) permitting program, the Natural Resources Defense Council filed suit.
NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1373 (D.C.Cir. 1977). Eventually, they prevailed in the liti-
gation, and the D.C. Circuit held that these types of exemptions were invalid. See id. at
1383. The environmentalists victory was short-lived. That same year, Congress amended
the Clean Water Act, and categorically exempted agricultural irrigation from NPDES
regulation. Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 33, 91 Stat. 1566, 1577 (l977) (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006)).
169 Henry Juszkiewicz, Repeal the Lacey Act? Hell No, Make It Stronger, THE HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/henry-juszkiewicz/gibson-guitars
-lacey-act_b_1071770.html; Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Dealing With Dumb and Dumber: The
Continuing Mission of Citizen Environmentalism, 20 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 9, 60 (2005)
(“[T]he environmental movement’s current political failures, of course, are in substantial
part attributable to the extraordinary and one could say unfair advantages that industry
has been able to mobilize, at taxpayer expense, to overwhelm the environmental media and
the political process.”).
170 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1983); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 cmt. e (“Matters calling for a client decision”).
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adhere to additional duties of competence,171 diligence,172 and the funda-
mental duty to communicate with the client to ensure informed consent.173
The lawyer could reasonably charge a fee for the service, too, because it
is so closely related to the legal representation of the client.174 But if the
lawyer fails to meet this duty, and fails to even suggest to the client the
potential for self-destructive harms, then the lawyer may face potential
consequences, too.175
When the ethical principles associated with the duty to advise—
coupled with the duty of communication and the duty to ensure informed
consent—are applied in the context of environmental advocacy, they lead
to a compelling conclusion. Low levels of client sophistication, and high
levels of controversy, may morph the discretionary duty as advisor into a
mandatory duty.176 When a client asks a lawyer to file a lawsuit, or to pur-
sue some other controversial form of representation, the lawyer has a duty
to ensure that the client is adequately informed.177 In the circumstance
where a lawyer recognizes that a client’s decision to pursue litigation may
harm the client’s own objectives, Model Rule 2.1 and the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers place a responsibility upon the
lawyer to speak up.178 Fundamentally, a lawyer should ensure that a client
is adequately informed and protected from substantial harms.
For a matter involving little controversy or little risk to the client,
or with a highly sophisticated client, the lawyer probably has no duty to
advise or engage in further inquiry.179 But as factors change, and as the
need to advise the client of the risks and consequences of advocacy in-
creases, the lawyer should probe the client for additional information, and
171 “Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and prepa-
ration reasonably necessary for the representation.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.1 (1983).
172 Diligence states that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.” Id. at R. 1.3 (1983).
173 Id. at R. 1.0, 1.3, 1.4 (1983); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 20 cmt. b (rationale).
174 Gantt, supra note 20, at 397 (explaining that an attorney should be justified in charging
legal rates for such services if two considerations are satisfied: (1) a principal reason why
the attorney is offering the nonlegal services is to aid the client in vindicating or advancing
a legal right or interest; and (2) according to Rule 5.7, the services are not “distinct” from
the legal services or if so, the client reasonably expects that the services are a part of the
legal service provided).
175 Id. at 398.
176 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 (2000).
177 Id.
178 Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1983).
179 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 (2000).
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may need to advise the client and further discuss the potential risks and
consequences. At some critical point, when the lawyer knows that the
legal action is likely to result in substantial adverse consequences to the
client, the discretion gives way to a mandate, and the lawyer must advise
the client of the risks and consequences ahead.180
TABLE 1: THE LAWYER’S DUTY AS ADVISOR
Admittedly, the precise limits of the discretionary and mandatory
duties—the point where inaction gives way to discretion, or the point where
discretion gives way to a mandate—remain uncertain and dependent upon
factual circumstances. That uncertainty explains the repeated emphasis
upon lawyer discretion in Model Rule 2.1. However, unlike the Restatement
(Third), which applies a reasonableness test to acknowledge a lawyer’s in-
creasing duties to less-sophisticated clients, the Model Rule commentary
goes too far.
Even in extraordinary circumstances, Model Rule 2.1, Comment 5
says only that a lawyer may be required to advise the client. This Comment
should be revised. If a lawyer knows of likely harm—such as the signifi-
cant potential for statutory reform or repeal—then the lawyer cannot stay
180 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1983).
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silent. The lawyer’s advisory duty should be clarified by amending the dis-
cretionary phrasing in the second sentence of Model Rule 2.1, Comment 5
to become a mandate, as follows:
Offering Advice
[5] . . . . However, when a lawyer knows that a client pro-
poses a course of action that is likely to result in substan-
tial adverse legal consequences to the client, the lawyer’s
duty to the client under Rule 1.4 may require that the law-
yer offer advice if the client’s course of action is related to
the representation. . . .181
This conclusion need not be limited to environmental advocacy
lawyers. The duty to advise should apply broadly to any circumstances
where the client is considering a legal action that the lawyer knows is
likely to harm the client. Presumably, rational clients do not intention-
ally pursue legal action for the purpose of harming themselves. But less-
informed clients might not recognize concerns that are readily foreseeable
to their attorneys. The client may not know that the last legislative session
just repealed a whole series of laws, but that fact will be well known to the
attorney who monitors the actions of state and federal legislatures. Even
informed but ideal-driven clients can make errors in strategic judgment on
matters of high controversy. By pursuing a lawsuit or advocacy strategy
on a highly controversial issue in a hostile political environment, that client
may invite undesirable budgetary, political, and legal consequences.182
181 Id. cmt. 5. In the alternative, this sentence should be rewritten, or entirely eliminated.
However, as currently written, the Commentary does have the benefit of a cross-reference
to the duty of communication in Model Rule 1.4. So, rather than complete elimination, an
alternative informative statement, that emphasizes neither discretion nor mandate, could
simply acknowledge that “[a] lawyer’s efforts to advise the client also fulfill the duty of
communication in Rule 1.4.”
182 While this article focuses on the potential for legislative responses to environmental
advocacy, the environmental lawyer, in serving as an advisor, may need to consider a
host of factors presenting similar risks. For example, the history of sea turtles, shrimp,
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) provides another example of
environmental advocacy litigation having counterproductive results, and the story involves
legislation, a domestic lawsuit, and the agency rule-making and international legislation
it spawned.
The National Marine Fisheries Service requires domestic shrimp fishing boats to in-
stall and use Turtle Excluder Devices (“TED”) to reduce the accidental “bycatch” of endan-
gered and threatened sea turtles. 50 C.F.R. §§ 217, 222, 227 (2012). Taking this notion
to the global scale, Congress required “certification” of foreign fisheries as having adopted
2012] THE DUTY TO ADVISE THE LORAX 65
In those circumstances, where a lawyer knows that a client’s pro-
posed actions will create adverse harm to the client, the lawyer fulfilling
the duty as advisor must ask the client difficult questions. In particular,
the duty as advisor compels the lawyer to discuss the potential outcomes
with the client to ensure informed consent183 and, perhaps, to save the
client from a form of self-destruction.184
a regulatory program governing the incidental taking of sea turtles restrictions that is com-
parable to the United States. Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609, 103 Stat. 988, 1037 (1989). The
U.S. Department of State sought to apply those restrictions in a phased manner, but
when the Secretary of State’s guidance documents initially applied the restrictions only
to the Caribbean region, Earth Island Institute brought suit in federal court, demanding
that the requirements be applied globally. The U.S. Court of International Trade ulti-
mately agreed, ordering the Secretary of State to implement Section 609 on imported
shrimp affecting sea turtles, “wherever harvested.” Earth Island Institute v. Christopher,
913 F. Supp. 559, 580 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1995); see also Earth Island Institute v. Christopher,
6 F.3d 648, 650 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of International
Trade, yet invalidating Section 609(a) as violating the separation of powers.)
Unwilling to abide by the demands of a domestic court decision, the foreign nations
of India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand brought suit. In an important opinion weighing
the benefits of environmental protection against the problems of unjustified trade discrimi-
nation, a panel of the World Trade Organization held that Section 609, and the U.S. mea-
sures to benefit sea turtles, violated GATT. See, e.g., Panel Report, U.S. Import Prohibition
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (Oct. 12, 1998). In response, and to
culminate a decade of legislation, guidance and litigation, the U.S. Department of State is-
sued new guidelines governing global shrimp fishery certification. See 64 Fed. Reg. 36946
(July 8, 1999). The WTO would even find that Section 609 was justified because the U.S.
was making serious good faith efforts to reach a multilateral agreement. Panel Report,
United State–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/RW
(June 15, 2001). Perhaps, in the grand view of foreign policy, some advocates from Earth
Island Institute might even view the tortured history of the shrimping certification require-
ments as a success.
Yet Earth Island Institute continued to litigate its demand for rapid domestic and
global implementation of the TED requirements in the U.S. courts. The resulting Federal
Circuit opinion, however, undermined the success already obtained, and reached a conclu-
sion that undermined the reasoning of the WTO: “we find that Congress with remarkable
unanimity was focused on protecting the domestic shrimp industry, not the sea turtle, when
it enacted section 609. Many of the comments made on the Senate floor reflected deep
skepticism about the effectiveness of TED requirements, and about the wisdom of placing
sea turtle conservation above the economic well-being of domestic shrimpers.” Turtle Island
Restoration Network v. Evans, 284 F.3d 1282, 1294–1295 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
183 See Bernard P. Perlmutter, George’s Story: Voice and Transformation Through the
Teaching and Practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law School Advocacy Clinic,
17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 561, 595 (2005) (discussing the need to engage clients in the
advocacy process and decisions).
184 Jan Ellen Rein, Clients With Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices—What’s an
Attorney to Do?: Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101,
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A. The Hard Questions an Advisor Must Ask
The lawyer’s duty to advise an environmental advocacy client can
be fulfilled, in part, by pursuing two lines of inquiry: one involving the
client’s sophistication, professionalism, and risk aversion, and the other
involving how the client might prepare for the potential controversies
ahead and responses by third parties. In other words, the lawyer must
advise on matters related to both internal (attorney-client) and external
(third-party) relationships, a notion once suggested by Canon 7-3 of the
Model Code: “a lawyer serving as adviser primarily assists his client in
determining the course of future conduct and relationships.”185
1. Looking Inward: Should a Client Exercise Self-Restraint?
The lawyer’s first line of inquiry, in exercising the duty as advisor,
focuses on the client. As a threshold matter, if the lawyer learns that the
client is highly sophisticated, and the matter is one of low controversy or
one that is unlikely to generate a risk of legal reform or repeal, then the
lawyer probably has no further duty to advise. But in the case where there
is high controversy, the duty to advise necessitates further inquiry on two
additional inward looking points.
First, the lawyer should advise on the tone the client should strike
in her endeavors. Specifically, a lawyer should consider advising the client
of the benefits and importance of courtesy and professionalism. Should
rhetorical flourish be included, or left out? Some scholars have noted that
lawyers can hide behind the cloak of zealous advocacy, and then deceive
or overreach.186 Rhetorical advocacy may also come with the high cost of
sacrificing public faith in the system of justice, or further incensing the
opposing viewpoints.187 Hostile advocacy is antithetical to the moral values
1162 (1994) (proposing “directions and mechanisms for avoiding the harm threatened by
self-destructive or socially destructive client impulses,” including a series of questions to
determine whether or not to interfere with client decisions).
185 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 (1980).
186 See Allen K. Harris, The Effect of Overzealous Advocacy on Professionalism—What Is a
Lawyer’s Duty Under Rule 1.3?, OKLA. B. J. (June 10, 2000), available at http://www.okbar
.org/ethics/harris.htm.
187 Even the opponents of the environmental movement, whether from industry, property
rights or other ideological perspectives, seek to represent their views of the competing
interests of humankind. Environmental law is often about respect for the earth, and reflects
the evolution of nuisance law, in turn premised upon mutual respect among neighbors. See,
e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (air pollution from smelters emitting
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of the environmental movement, and even perhaps self-defeating.188 The
tongue (and the pen) can be unruly evils.189
Attorneys take oaths,190 and follow codes of conduct, that call for
civility and professionalism.191 While such professionalism is largely aspi-
rational and hard to define, and even though precise expectations vary from
place to place,192 these concepts should certainly be among the factors con-
sidered by the lawyer and client when they evaluate the likely responses
to their legal advocacy actions. Professionalism from the outset increases
the likelihood of effectiveness in the end.193
Next, in addition to evaluating the client’s advocacy tone, and as a
continued part of this introspective inquiry, the lawyer should assess the
client’s degree of risk aversion. Is the client prepared for the potential con-
troversies ahead and willing to face the risk that the proposed legal actions
could lead to the defunding, reform, or repeal of the laws and policies for
which they advocate? If the client is risk adverse, then the lawyer may ad-
vise of the need for self-restraint. Again, these types of questions are an
essential component of the duty to obtain informed consent which requires
the lawyer to communicate “adequate information and explanation about
the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed
sulphurous acid gas in Tennessee was drifting into Georgia and causing damage); New
York v. New Jersey, 283 U.S. 473 (1931) (new sewage discharge from New Jersey was
being proposed).
188 Fajans & Falk, supra note 118, at 2.
189 James 3:8–10 (King James) (“[N]o man can tame the tongue. It is an unruly evil, full
of deadly poison.”).
190 The Florida Bar, Oath of Admission to the Florida Bar (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www
.floridabar.org/tfb/TFBProfess.nsf/basic+view/04E9EB581538255A85256B2F006CCD7D
?OpenDocument (“To opposing parties and their counsel, I pledge fairness, integrity, and
civility, not only in court, but also in all written and oral communications.”).
191 Professionalism and civility are also discussed in the Florida’s Guidelines for Professional
Conduct, which note that the judiciary and its lawyers must ensure the respect of the public
they serve. The Florida Bar, Henry Latimer Center for Professionalism, Guidelines for
Professional Conduct, Preamble, http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/TFBProfess.nsf/5d2a29f983
dc81ef85256709006a486a/2f2668cdfd7b99e085256b2f006ccd15#Preamble (“[A] lawyer must
always be conscious of his or her broader duty to the judicial system that serves both
attorney and client. To the judiciary, a lawyer owes candor, diligence and utmost respect.
To the administration of justice, a lawyer unquestionably owes the fundamental duties of
personal dignity and professional integrity. Coupled with those duties is a lawyer’s duty of
courtesy and cooperation with fellow professionals for the efficient administration of our
system of justice and the respect of the public it serves.”).
192 Keith W. Rizzardi, Defining Professionalism: I Know It When I See It?, 79 FLA. B. J. 38,
38 (2005).
193 Neil Hamilton & Verna Monson, The Positive Empirical Relationship of Professionalism
to Effectiveness in the Practice of Law, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 137, 137 (2011).
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course of conduct.”194 But if the client remains fully committed to the advo-
cacy cause, then the lawyer has another set of questions to ask.
2. Looking Outward: What Happens When Others React?
In this second major area of inquiry, the lawyer and client consider
third parties. The lawyer’s advice should consider not only the potential
adverse effects on third parties;195 rather, it should also include assess-
ments of what those third parties might do, especially to the client.196 In
other words, as the risks of controversy and third party opposition in-
crease, so too does the duty of the lawyer to advise the client and to ask the
question: what might others do in response?197
In assessing the risks, the lawyer and client should give special
attention to the likely remedies, and to the third parties likely to be af-
fected.198 With that understanding, the lawyer should then consider the
potential for a successful legal action to trigger undesired consequences.199
194 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (1983).
195 See, e.g., id. at R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (1983) (“[L]awyers usually defer to the client regarding
such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be
adversely affected.”).
196 In the context of tort reform, scholars have suggested that the lawyers and their in-
terest groups are engaged in a social theory battleground. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H.
Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground
of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002).
197 These types of considerations will reflect the broadest notions of the role of the lawyer
as advocate and lobbyist who protects the client from harms by others. See, e.g., Martha F.
Davis, Our Better Half: A Public Interest Lawyer Reflects on Pro Bono Lawyering and
Social Change Litigation, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 123 (2001) (discussing
Edward V. Sparer, The New Legal Aid as an Instrument of Social Change, 1965 U. ILL. L.F.
57, 59–60 (1965) (“The new legal aid lawyer’s role should be defined by the broadest reaches
of advocacy.”)); see also Christine Schiltz & Dave Swayze, The Delaware Lawyer as Lobbyist,
21 DEL. LAW. 18 (2003).
198 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (1983).
199 Of course, an analysis of the risk of consequences could require a lawyer to consider
countless factors, but in light of current events, certainly necessitates attention to the costs
of the remedies and the scope of regulatory consequences. For example, as the economic con-
sequences of the proposed remedies become greater, the risk of legislative reaction increases.
Similarly, a lawsuit seeking to compel one defendant to fix one environmental harm
in a specific location probably creates fewer budgetary or policy concerns than an initiative
of nationwide scope directed at dozens of companies. A petition to list one new endangered
species of plant probably creates less risk than a petition to list a few hundred species.
However, careful attention to the scope of the consequences is also important, because the
petition to list one plant as a threatened species, due to the effects of human recreation in 
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As explained above, the worst-case consequences for successful environ-
mental advocacy could include defunding, reform, or repeal of the laws or
regulations the client relies upon.
To avoid adverse consequences, the lawyer should ask whether the
client has considered retaining members from another profession. For bet-
ter or for worse, lobbyists,200 media and communication consultants,201 and
even political campaign strategists202 might have essential roles to play in
the grand scheme of a client’s environmental advocacy initiative. In fact,
pursuant to Comment 4 to Model Rule 2.1, the duty as advisor encourages
lawyers to make exactly these kinds of recommendations:
[4] Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also
be in the domain of another profession. Family matters
can involve problems within the professional competence
of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work; business
matters can involve problems within the competence of the
accounting profession or of financial specialists. Where con-
sultation with a professional in another field is itself some-
thing a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer
should make such a recommendation. At the same time, a
lawyer’s advice at its best often consists of recommending a
course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations
of experts.203
National environmental groups, with well-developed lobbying or
public relations strategies, will be well equipped to make difficult strategic
a single national park, creates far fewer concerns with expanded regulatory scope than
a petition to list one arctic species—the polar bears—could have on the regulation of global
climate change.
200 Matthew C. Stephenson & Howell E. Jackson, Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents: Implications
for Public Policy in a Pluralist System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1 (2010).
201 See, e.g., Scott H. Segal & Ricardo Reyes, Masks and Mystification: The Challenges
of Media Relations and Public Relations for Lawyers, 67 TEX. B. J. 752, 752–53 (2004)
(characterizing the practice of law as an exercise in targeted communication, and discussing
the need for audience identification, message development and strategic communications);
see also Plater, supra note 9, at 511.
202 See, e.g., Jonathan S. Fox, Push Polling: The Art of Political Persuasion, 49 FLA. L.
REV. 563, 564 (Sept. 1997) (describing a political strategy to advocate for a cause); Bill
Zimmerman, California Initiatives: If They Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix ’Em, 41 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1027, 1027–28 (2001) (noting the use of ballot initiatives to achieve codification of
environmental policy).
203 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 4 (1983).
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decisions, and have less need for the lawyer’s non-legal cautionary advice.204
But for an inexperienced client, the lawyer must play a greater role. Com-
ment 3 to Model Rule 2.1 acknowledges that when a request for purely
technical advice is made “by a client inexperienced in legal matters . . . the
lawyer’s responsibility as advisor may include indicating that more may
be involved than strictly legal considerations.”205 In the context of trial pub-
licity, the Model Rules allow lawyers, pursuant to the duty as advocate,
to help rebut adverse publicity prejudicing their clients.206 That responsi-
bility to advise an unsophisticated client on responsive communications
strategies readily applies to the environmental advocacy lawyer, too.
Through these two inward and outward looking inquiries, the
lawyer can ensure that the client considers likely actions, reactions, and
outcomes. Pursuant to the duty as advisor, the lawyer should ask the ap-
propriate probing questions. The answers are then left to the clients.207
B. The Consequences of Failing to Advise
If a lawyer wholly fails to ask the hard questions, and fails to
advise a client of the known and significant risks inherent in a client’s
chosen course of action, then the lawyer may, in effect, be allowing or even
be complicit in a client’s self-destructive act.208 In such circumstances, the
lawyer might bear a degree of responsibility and liability.209 Just as health
204 See, e.g., Brian Ginsberg, Tarasoff at Thirty: Victim’s Knowledge Shrinks the Psycho-
therapist’s Duty to Warn and Protect, 21 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2004). See
generally SWITCHBOARD: NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL STAFF BLOG http://
switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/legwatch/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
205 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 3 (1983).
206 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(c) (1983) (“[A] lawyer may make a statement
that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial
undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer’s client.
A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is
necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.”).
207 As the Model Rules make clear, the client bears the ultimate authority to determine the
purposes to be served by legal representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2
cmt. 1 (1983).
208 See, e.g., Roy D. Simon, Legal Ethics Advisors and the Interests of Justice: Is an Ethics
Advisor a Conscience or a Co-Conspirator?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1869, 1869 (2002) (discuss-
ing DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE (2000) (criticizing lawyers “for their
passivity—one might even say complicity—in the face of client decisions and goals that are
amoral, immoral, or even destructive”)).
209 An environmental lawyer whose client’s favorite statute is repealed may evade a cause
of action for malpractice, because the intervening legislative actions are probably too at-
tenuated. In general, malpractice applies negligence standards. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE-ELEMENTS AND DEFENSES
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professionals adhere to the ethical principle of non-maleficence and bear
responsibility to “do no harm,”210 so too does the environmental lawyer
have a duty as advisor to protect the environmental advocacy client from
harm.211 Indeed, regardless of whether the matter is viewed as one of law-
yer professionalism or through the lens of lawyering as a business, the
lawyer should always work to prevent the client from harm.212
It is considered professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.213 As explained above, in some cases,
such as where the client is unsophisticated and the risk of controversy and
potential reform is high, the lawyer’s duty to advise should be considered
a mandate.214 In those instances, failure to advise the clients of the risk,
and thus failure to obtain informed consent, should be considered miscon-
duct, and perhaps even malpractice.215 The notion of such an enforceable
ethical duty to advise is not unprecedented,216 and similar ethical duties
GENERALLY § 48 cmt. c (2000). Here the negligence would arguably result from a lawyer’s
“injury” to an environmental advocacy group based on failure to provide advice as to the
risks. But for such a claim to prevail, a court must find that: (1) a duty was owed by the
counselor to the client; (2) the duty owed was breached; (3) there is a sufficient legal causal
connection between the breach of duty and the client’s injury; and (4) some injury or dam-
ages were suffered by the client. In practice, even if a lawyer’s courtroom victory induced
a legislature to repeal the law that triggered the matter, the third prong of the negligence
test is probably failed, because the attenuation is probably too extended. The actions of an
entire branch of government cannot reasonably be placed upon a single lawyer, or even
a single case. Id. § 53.
210 The Hippocratic Oath does not contain these exact words. The Hippocratic Oath, GREEK
MEDICINE, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
But see HIPPOCRATES, OF THE EPIDEMICS, Book I (Francis Adams trans. 400 B.C.) (“The
physician must . . . have two special objects in view . . . namely, to do good or do no harm.”).
211 See, e.g., John D. King, Candor, Zeal, and the Substitution of Judgment: Ethics and the
Mentally Ill Criminal Defendant, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 207, 213 (2008) (discussing ethical
challenges for a criminal defense lawyer when a client is “making self-destructive and
senseless decisions not as the result of rational thought, but because of a mental illness
or impairment that prevents the client from making a rational decision”).
212 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventive Law and the Lawyering
Process, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L. 849, 857–58 (1999) (discussing movements to replace
the “professionalism paradigm” of lawyering with a “business paradigm”). See generally,
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 16 (1983).
213 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (1983) (stating that “[i]t is professional mis-
conduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another”).
214 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 (2000).
215 Id.
216 Consider, for example, the lawyer with an elderly client of diminished capacity. That
lawyer has a recognized duty to both advise and to act. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.14(b) (1983) (“When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished
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have been placed upon mental health professionals.217 For example, in
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., therapists were found potentially
liable in tort for the violent acts of their patients.218 The therapists simply
had not asked the right questions, and thus, became responsible, in part,
for the consequences of the patients’ behaviors.219 Modern ethical codes
frequently apply that Tarasoff principle, and repeatedly include a duty to
protect the patient and to ensure informed consent.220
Counselors must recognize the need for informed consent, and re-
spect the clients’ right to choose for themselves, while also ensuring that
they avoid harm without imposing their own values.221 Physicians must
ensure that they provide adequate medical information to achieve informed
consent,222 and patients also need to be advised of the side effects of their
capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken
and cannot adequately act in the client’s own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably nec-
essary protective action.”). A lawyer who fails to protect a client with diminished capacity
may even be subject to malpractice claims. Kerry R. Peck, Ethical Issues in Representing
Elderly Clients with Diminished Capacity, 99 ILL. B. J. 572, 573–76 (Nov. 2011), http://www
.isba.org/ibj/2011/11/ethicalissuesinrepresentingelderlyc; Hope C. Todd, Representing
Clients with Diminished Capacity, DC BAR (May 2010), http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers
/resources/publications/washington_lawyer/may_2010/ethics.cfm. Model Rule 1.14(b) also
allows a lawyer to take “reasonably necessary protective action” when a client with dimin-
ished capacity is at risk of substantial harm and is unable to act in his or her own interest.
See AM. B. ASSOC. COMM. ON LAW & AGING; AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC., ASSESSMENT OF
OLDER ADULTS WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 2, available at
http://www.apa.org/pi/aging/resources/guides/diminished-capacity.pdf. And notably, the
absence of informed consent is a substantial part of the reason for the attorney’s malpractice
exposure in cases of diminished capacity. Id. at 6; see also Arthur C. Walsh et al., MENTAL
CAPACITY 17–22 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the caselaw concerning the lawyer’s malpractice
liability for knowingly allowing an incapacitated person to execute legal documents).
217 AM. COUNSELING ASS’N, ACA CODE OF ETHICS 3–4 (2005), available at http://www
.counseling.org/ethics/feedback/ACA2005Code.pdf.
218 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal.3d 425, 425, 433–35 (1976).
219 Id. at 439.
220 AM. COUNSELING ASS’N, ACA CODE OF ETHICS 4 (2005), available at http://www
.counseling.org/ethics/feedback/ACA2005Code.pdf.
221 Id. at 4–5.
222 AM. MED. ASS’N, AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, OPINION 8.08 INFORMED CONSENT,
https://ssl3.ama-assn.org/apps/ecomm/PolicyFinderForm.pl?site=www.ama-assn.org
&uri=%2fresources%2fdoc%2fPolicyFinder%2fpolicyfiles%2fHnE%2fE-8.08.HTM (“The
patient’s right of self-decision can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses
enough information to enable an informed choice. The patient should make his or her own
determination about treatment. The physician’s obligation is to present the medical facts
accurately to the patient or to the individual responsible for the patient’s care and to make
recommendations for management in accordance with good medical practice. The physi-
cian has an ethical obligation to help the patient make choices from among the therapeutic
alternatives consistent with good medical practice.”).
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prescriptions by doctors, pharmacists, and drug companies.223 Psychologists
have ethical duties to obtain informed consent for treatments, and to in-
form their clients of the potential risks involved, the alternative treatments
that may be available, and the voluntary nature of their participation.224
Social workers, too, must respect and promote the right of clients to self-
determination, but have duties to advise the client of responsibilities to the
larger society or to specific legal obligations, and to limit clients’ rights if
the clients’ actions could pose a serious, foreseeable, and imminent risk to
themselves or others.225
Lawyers, like health professionals, have a duty to protect clients
from self-inflicted harm.226 To fulfill that duty, they ask hard questions
to help the clients avoid those harms, and prepare clients for worst case
scenarios.227 Indeed, the questions used to evaluate whether a health pro-
fessional did enough to prevent a suicide bear ready applicability to the
lawyer who sits in a role as advisor.228 With only minor rewriting, those
223 Helen Kiel, Pharmacist Advice: Where Should the Line Be Drawn and Who Should Draw
It?, 7 HARV. HEALTH POL’Y REV. 189, 190 (2006).
224 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF
CONDUCT 6–7, 10, 13 (2010), available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx.
225 NAT’L ASS’N OF SOC. WORKERS DELEGATE ASSEMBLY, NAT’L ASS’N OF SOC. WORKERS,
CODE OF ETHICS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS 4, 16–17 (2008),
available at http://www.socialworkers.org/pubs/code/code.asp.
226 See, e.g., Carol M. Suzuki, When Something Is Not Quite Right: Considerations for
Advising a Client to Seek Mental Health Treatment, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J.
209, 220–21 (2009) (“Model Rule 2.1 supports the . . . argument that the lawyer is a moral
actor in fulfilling a broad community role, including considerations of a client’s health and
the impact of the client’s health on others. Model Rule 2.1 permits, but does not require,
that a lawyer discuss areas outside of the legal field when offering advice. A lawyer may
counsel her client on a client matter that is outside of the confines of the legal matter.
Moreover, the rule allows the lawyer to use her professional judgment in determining the
parameters of the ‘client’s situation’ that the lawyer will address. Although health-related
matters are not an enumerated factor under Model Rule 2.1 to which a lawyer may refer,
advice to a client to seek mental health evaluation and treatment may fit within the param-
eters of a ‘client’s situation’ that a lawyer may consider. Of course, neither Model Rule 2.1
nor any other rule allows a lawyer to practice in the area of mental health and render
mental health opinions, advice or diagnoses absent relevant education and licensure.”).
227 See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, Going Underground: The Ethics of Advising a Battered
Woman Fleeing an Abusive Relationship, 75 U. MO.–KAN. CITY L. REV. 999, 1007 (2007).
228 CHRISTIANE BREMS, DEALING WITH CHALLENGES IN PSYCHOTHERAPY AND COUNSELING, 165
(Marlene Vasilieff et al. eds., 2000). The author proposed the following questions to deter-
mine whether a health professional’s duty as advisor was satisfied in avoiding a suicide:
(1) Was the counselor aware or should have been aware of the risk?
(2) Was the counselor thorough in assessment of the client’s sui-
cide risk?
(3) Did the counselor make “reasonable and prudent efforts” to
collect sufficient and necessary data to assess risk?
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questions can be used to shape an inquiry as to whether the lawyer’s risk
assessment fulfilled the lawyer’s duty as advisor:
(1) Was the lawyer aware (or should the lawyer have
been aware) of the risk?
(2) Was the lawyer thorough in assessment of the cli-
ent’s risk?
(3) Did the lawyer make “reasonable and prudent ef-
forts” to collect sufficient and necessary data to
assess risk?
(4) Were the data misused, thus leading to a different
recommendation that would have been provided by
another lawyer?
(5) Was the lawyer negligent in the way she or he ad-
vised the client after assessing risk?
(6) Did the lawyer make adequate attempts to keep the
client safe (i.e., considering alternatives, including
taking no action)?
Even in cases where the lawyer asks and obtains satisfactory an-
swers to the hard questions, the client may still proceed with the proposed
legal action. The lawyer may also continue to represent the client. Having
forewarned the client of the risks, but then serving as the client’s voice,
the lawyer may carry some degree of personal guilt if the harm ultimately
manifests as the lawyer predicted.229 Still, so long as the lawyer asked the
(4) Were the assessment data misused, thus leading to a misdiag-
nosis where the same data would have resulted in appropriate
diagnosis by another mental health professional?
(5) Did the counselor mismanage the case, being either “unavailable
or unresponsive to the client’s emergency situation?”
(6) Was the counselor negligent in the way she or he designed her
or his intervention with the client after assessing risk?
(7) Did the counselor make adequate attempts to keep the client
safe (i.e., set up a plan of contingencies with appropriate re-
sources, phone numbers, etc)?
(8) Did the counselor remove the means to be used by the client in
the suicide attempt?
(9) In cases of minors, were parents or caretakers informed of the
client’s potential risk?
Id.
229 Michael K. McChrystal, Lawyers and Loyalty, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 367, 380–81 (1992)
(“[E]thics rules legislate a required response to the problem of paternalistic loyalty, but this
does not make the problem go away. Rather, the rules simply direct lawyers to live with the
guilt of harming their clients by acceding to their clients’ self-destructive wishes.”).
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right questions, and identified the risks of harm to the client, the lawyer
will have complied with the duty as advisor.
CONCLUSION
The lawyer’s duty as advisor should not be viewed as merely aspi-
rational. As a client’s sophistication decreases, and the risk of adverse
consequences increases, the lawyer’s duty as advisor shifts from discretion-
ary to mandatory. If a lawyer knows that a proposed legal action is likely
to cause significant harm to the client, the lawyer must advise the client.
Comment 5 to Model Rule 2.1 should be amended to reflect this point.
The duty as advisor becomes especially provocative when applied
to the practice of environmental law.230 What good is a victorious lawsuit if
the statute is repealed? Although a particular statute might be available
as a tool for environmental advocacy, and even though some related ob-
jective can be pursued, clients should be advised by their lawyer to con-
sider whether or not they should pursue their proposed legal strategies.
The goal, after all, is informed decision-making. Thus, the duty to advise
clients on moral, economic, social, and political factors requires warning
the clients of the potential reactions to advocacy success.
The Lorax could not stop the Once-ler, and the Lawyer probably
cannot stop the Lorax. The idea of a lawyer statesman may be extinct,231
and an occasional overreach by environmental advocates may rank among
the class of human problems lacking a technical solution.232 A degree of
defunding, reform, or repeal may be the inevitable consequence of environ-
mental advocacy. Still, lawyers have a duty to advise their clients not to
lose sight of the forest for the trees.
230 Although this article focuses upon environmental advocacy, many of its principles
could be applied to other areas of public interest advocacy. The current facts related to
environmental law and policy make the risks of reform or repeal quite real, and help to
illustrate the points herein. See Pete Aleshire, Groups Protest Backdoor Repeal of Host of
Environmental Laws, PAYSON ROUNDUP (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.paysonroundup.com
/news/2011/aug/02/groups-protest-backdoor-repeal-host-environmental-/.
231 See ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
11–13 (1993) (discussing the collapse of the ideal of the lawyer-statesman, and the declining
prestige of prudence and public-spiritedness).
232 See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243 (Dec. 13,
1968).
